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Abstract: New ventures that are unable to fund expansion using internal equity or that 
prefer to maintain complete firm ownership may supplement existing cash flow by 
accessing external funds in the form of debt contracts. To overcome liabilities of newness  
and/or smallness, these firms send signals to external stakeholders intended to represent a 
sufficient level of legitimacy and worthiness of investment. Stakeholders attempt to 
overcome information asymmetry by focusing primarily on costly signals from high-
quality firms that represent honesty, credibility, and commitment. However, many new 
ventures are unable to send these signals because they do not possess them. In this study, I 
examine signal opacity as specific signals that capture stakeholders’ attention by 
alleviating the imbalance of information asymmetry yet are difficult to fully verify due to 
distortion and a signaling environment of high information verification costs. I also 
examine the decision-making strategy of the debt financier who utilizes heuristics in the 
form of expertise to make a probability judgment of credit worthiness based on opaque 
information presented by the new venture. As an extension of institutional and signaling 
theory, I theorize that new venture signals that are opaque and exist in a signaling 
environment of high information verification costs will have a positive effect on 
stakeholders’ perceptions of legitimacy. I also theorize that the effect of signal opacity 
and information verification costs is moderated by stakeholder expertise, which is 
comprised of industry experience.  
The findings of the qualitative portion were leveraged to validate the hypothesized 
variable composition of the signal opacity construct as well as to develop the survey 
instrument used in the quantitative analysis. The results of the main study are intriguing, 
finding that within environments of high signal opacity, stakeholders will perceive 
superior and poor new venture signals similarly when granting legitimacy judgments.  
Alternatively, the findings also show that within environments of low signal opacity, 
stakeholders will perceive superior and poor new venture signals differently when 
assessing legitimacy. Lastly, the findings do not support the notion that stakeholder 
experience is an important factor when making legitimacy perceptions based on these 
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New ventures that are unable to fund expansion using internal equity or that prefer to 
maintain complete firm ownership may supplement existing cash flow by accessing 
external funds in the form of debt contracts (Berger & Udell, 1998). To overcome the 
liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and of smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 1986), 
firms attempt to send signals that represent a sufficient level of legitimacy and worthiness 
of investment to external stakeholders (Rutherford & Buller, 2007; Connelly, Certo, 
Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Karlsson & Middleton, 2015). The Bergh, Connelly, Ketchen, 
and Shannon (2014) research on signaling discusses a separating equilibrium as a 
mechanism that differentiates between high- and low-quality signal senders. Stakeholders 
attempt to overcome information asymmetry by focusing primarily on these high-quality 
and low-cost signals as they represent honesty, credibility, and commitment (Spence, 
1973, Connelly et al., 2011). For example, according to signaling theory, a low-quality 
venture will incur higher costs to send signals compared to high-quality ventures (Bergh et al., 
2014). However, many new ventures are unable to send preferred high-quality and low-cost 
signals (historical financials, collateral, liquidity, etc.) because they do not possess them. 




perception to stakeholders that a separating equilibrium will occur, which is unlikely due to 
the new venture’s liabilities.  
This sets the stage for one of this study’s primary research questions: How are new 
ventures able to secure the perception of legitimacy and eventual funding when they do not 
always possess optimal signals comparable to a mature firm? A logical notion is that a 
pooling equilibrium exists, which occurs when there is a lack of an inverse quality-cost 
relationship. This would theoretically provide an accessible environment where a new 
venture may attain legitimacy when competing for external capital against comparable new 
ventures (Bergh et al., 2014). A pooling equilibrium suggests that new ventures may 
uniformly send signals at similar costs, thus creating a stakeholder conundrum in assessing 
the level of quality (Bergh et al., 2014). This conundrum brings about the second primary 
question of this study: How are stakeholders able to effectively process and evaluate new 
venture signals to make a legitimacy decision when actual quality is difficult to assess due to 
similar costs?  
Existing management literature explores the phenomenon of signaling and perceptions of 
legitimacy with incomplete information. The Connelly et al. (2011) analysis of signaling 
literature explores multiple concepts, including signal fit, which describes the extent to which 
the signaler actually possesses the intended underlying qualities (honesty, credibility, and 
commitment). Bitektine (2011) explores evaluator judgments under conditions of 
uncertainty, such as utilizing heuristics when perceived information search costs are high and 
relying on easily observable qualities to compensate for the unknown. Suchman (1995) and 
Tost (2011, p. 696) research a stakeholder’s passive evaluation of incomplete information by 




However, there is currently a lack of literature that isolates and examines the perception 
of specific signals that possess preferred high-quality characteristics on the surface, yet 
motivates the signal receiver to take a passive- rather than active-processing judgment path 
(Bitektine & Haack, 2015). During an active evaluation, the stakeholder exerts a higher level 
of mental processing effort by basing the information received according to an 
“institutionally prescribed” set of social norms (Suchman, 1995; Bitektine & Haack, 2015). 
Existing research finds that a passive evaluation frequently predominates active when 
stakeholders could access validity cues and perform a visual conformity to social norms 
(Tost, 2011). By focusing on this, stakeholders can decrease the amount of time and effort 
exerted in the judgement formation process (Tost, 2011). In this study, I aim to build upon 
this research and to fill a gap in literature by introducing and clarifying the “Signal Opacity” 
construct. Signal opacity refers to a signal’s ability to capture the receiver’s attention by 
appearing as a verifiable high-quality signal and bringing balance to the disproportionate 
level of information asymmetry, yet demotivates the receiver from actively interpreting the 
signal due to its level of distortion and its existence within a signaling environment of high 
information verification costs. I also examine how signal opacity instigates the utilization of 
heuristics by a signal receiver by leveraging their expertise as a decision-making strategy to 
passively determine legitimacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Levie & Gimmon, 2008). 
I focus on the context of debt contracts in entrepreneurial firms due to the evaluation 
processes and post-funding practices of financial institutions (commercial banks). Unlike 
equity lenders (venture capitalists) who work alongside ventures by providing real-time 
advice to aid in firm growth and positive returns (Winton & Yerramilli, 2008), debt providers 




the securitization of personal guarantees and/or collateral (Berger & Udell, 1998; Berger, 
Klapper, & Udell, 1999). Also, debt providers are able to offer a multitude of products and 
services (deposit accounts, treasury services, wealth management) that enable the creation of 
full banking relationships and aid in the perception of creditworthiness. This contrasts equity 
vehicles, which may be transaction driven primarily by venture profitability (Berger et al., 
1999). 
In this study, I will make the following contributions to existing research. First, I will 
extend signaling theory by identifying specific groups of signals with varying levels of 
opacity and information verification costs to test its effect on stakeholders’ process of signal 
analysis. Signal opacity is theoretically effective when it lowers the amount of information 
asymmetry yet promotes passivity due to its distortion and verification costs. Information 
asymmetry is a core component of signaling theory focusing on the fact that “different people 
know different things” (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 469); and signals of honesty, credibility, and 
commitment act as a medium between two parties to bring balance to a skewed level of 
information asymmetry (Connelly et al., 2011). Within scenarios of potential opportunism 
where adverse selection may occur (financial transactions), receivers may focus on signals 
that alleviate information asymmetry and the chance of false signals (Ross, 1973; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Distortion within a signal’s environment consists of: 1) the observability of 
the signal, and 2) the noise caused by the signaler’s behavior or other external referents 
(Connelly et al., 2011; Gomulya & Mishina, 2017). From a strategic perspective, signalers 
may leverage distortion in a signal environment to enhance an otherwise disappointing signal 
(Rynes, Bretz, & Gerhart, 1991; Connelly et al., 2011; Anderson & McMullen, 2012). For 




within a bullish financial market where seasoned competitors are performing well (Janney & 
Folta, 2006; Yao, Zhu, & Wei, 2019). In this example, the distortion in the signaling 
environment is the strong financial market and the success of industry competitors. This may 
create a perception to the investor that regardless of a lack of previous performance, a new 
venture may succeed based on the strong economy and its competitors’ success. Information 
verification costs exists between the signal sender and receiver and consists of: 1) a sender 
signaling a high level of quality by inferring that high costs were required to produce the 
signal, and 2) a receiver incurring transactional (monetary and/or time and effort) costs to 
verify the actual quality of the signal (Spence, 1973; Connelly et al., 2011). Within the logic 
of signal opacity, a signaling environment with high information costs primarily corresponds 
with the verification costs incurred by signal receivers. This is due the fact that this theory 
focuses on how verification costs influence the perceptions of the signal receiver rather than 
the effort expended by the sender.  
I also draw upon institutional theory to demonstrate that signal opacity in an environment 
of high verification costs effectively enacts passive legitimacy perceptions of stakeholders. 
For instance, during an investor’s appraisal of a new venture, the investor may focus his/her 
attention away from the venture’s economic performance to its conformity of acceptable 
societal norms or its abiding by formal rules and regulations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
March & Olsen, 1984). This is because the investor’s ability to actively absorb and process 
the signal is hindered due to its level of opacity and verification costs (Peake & D’Souza, 
2015). Investors must then rely on their own perception of how these signals relate to 
existing norms and formal rules through their own acknowledgment of cues that bring clarity 




This process relates to this study’s next contribution to existing psychology literature 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), which examines the utilization of heuristics and biases of 
decision makers. By extending the research of Tost (2011) and Bitektine and Haack (2015), I 
will examine passivity within the relationship of signal opacity and verification costs with 
legitimacy perceptions. Unlike the high-level of mental effort exerted in active evaluations, 
passivity is correlated with the accessing of validity cues when the entirety of information is 
unavailable and time is critical (Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015). This 
processing method provides a potential theoretical explanation as to why specific signals are 
deemed legitimate without being fully verifiable. This is because investors must be efficient 
with their time and energy, which equates to ensuring that the costs of verifying quality (i.e., 
cognitive energy, transaction costs) are kept at a minimum to ensure eventual future profit is 
at an optimal level (Tost, 2011).  
Further integrating literature from psychology, I examine a moderating role of receiver 
expertise on the effect of signal opacity and verification costs with a stakeholder’s legitimacy 
perception. Expertise has been described as the amount of human capital of the signal 
receiver, such as years of experience as well as their depth of schemas or past experiences 
with similar signals (Heil & Robertson, 1991; Bruns, Holland, Shepherd, & Wiklund, 2008). 
This theory was expanded by Dane and Pratt (2007) through their expert-based schema 
construct, which utilized heuristics to recognize patterns from previous experiences to make 
logical decisions when the entirety of information is unavailable. 
In the following, Chapter II will provide an extensive review of institutional theory across 
multiple streams of literature. This broad spectrum provides an avenue to efficiently illustrate 




explore legitimacy perceptions through passive processing by leveraging heuristics and 
biases to acknowledge and quickly validate cues that conform to social norms. This review 
will continue by providing an overview of signaling theory across literature to provide a 
theoretical basis for opacity levels in a signaling environment. This section also provides a 
glimpse into the methodological framework by detailing the overlap between signaling 
theory and a new venture’s quest for external capital in the form of bank debt. This chapter 
concludes with a development of the hypotheses that illustrate the strategic power of signal 
opacity. Chapter III discusses the methodological procedures utilized for data collection, 
measure development, and analysis utilizing an exploratory sequential mixed methods 
research design. Chapter IV provides the qualitative and quantitative findings of the analysis, 








LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
To provide theoretical support, this study will focus on the microprocesses of 
institutional theory and signaling theory. Institutional theory explores the notion that to 
gain the perception of legitimacy, an organization must fit or conform to an evaluator’s 
optimal “judgment scale,” which aligns with current regulative, social, or cognitive 
norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995; Deephouse, 1996; Suddaby, 
Bitektine, & Haack, 2017).  
Existing literature explores institutional theory through individuals’ social judgments 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966, Bitektine & Haack, 2015). This focus on the microlevel is 
due to the fact that the explanatory factors of macro issues and the relationships between 
aggregate variables are predominantly found at this level (Felin & Foss, 2005). This 
“pulling down” effect (Powell & Colyva, 2008) enabled researchers to explore 
institutional theory within a multitude of contexts, such as individual schemas and social 
classifications (i.e., ethnomethodological approach) (Bittner, 1967; Zucker, 1977).  
In contrast to these perspectives, researchers of institutional theory also view 
microfoundations as “half-truths,” meaning examinations of the institution should not be 




interactions that collectively appear through individual communicative efforts (Barney & 
Felin, 2013). This means that microconcepts should not only be discussed within microlevel 
disciplines like psychology, but should blend other macrolevel disciplines and ultimately pair 
down to the microlevel (Barney & Felin, 2013). These viewpoints brought about research on 
microfoundations of legitimacy judgments, detailing passive modes of thought through 
cognitive processing of legitimacy judgments (Bitektine & Haack, 2015). 
At its current state, signaling theory and its components should also be considered a 
microfoundational theory of macrolevel topics such as organizational behavior and strategy 
(Greve, 2013). However, this theory is evident across multiple levels of analysis, such as the 
organization and industry level and can be considered a macrofoundational theory as well 
(Etzion, 2009). From the reader’s perspective, signaling theory at the macrolevel can become 
intertwined with institutional theory, with one highlighting the communication of 
information and the other legitimizing (Suchman, 1995). To differentiate between the macro 
and micro levels, this study focuses on the individual-level processes associated with 
signaling theory. Literature examines these microprocesses, such as interaction rituals 
(Goffman, 1967) and sensegiving (Polanyi, 1967; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Interaction 
rituals, or “face work,” entail strategies individuals use to differentiate themselves to become 
accepted into more prestigious social groups (Goffman, 1967). Sensegiving evolved from an 
exploration of communication through speech to the use of strategic images and symbols to 
initiate sensemaking cues by the receiver. Sensegiving has also been found as a method of 
gaining stakeholder support by manipulating or influencing the ultimate outcome or 




Within this study’s theory, specific signals are sent to stakeholders who evaluate and 
determine judgments by utilizing cues that are embedded in signals and validated by their 
own preconceived notions or beliefs (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Bitektine, 2011; Haack & 
Sieweke, 2018). When faced with a signal environment of incomplete information, 
evaluators may passively analyze cues through the use of cognitive processes, such as 
heuristics and biases (Bitektine & Haack, 2015). I will incorporate each of these theoretical 
microprocesses to provide a basis for the legitimacy perceptions of these signals. I will also 
provide a clarification of the signal opacity construct, a review of institutional and signaling 
theory across multiple literature disciplines, and a development of hypotheses to provide a 
basis for my theory. 
Clarifying Signal Opacity 
To fully clarify signal opacity, I followed the blueprint utilized by Suddaby (2010), 
which focuses on: 1) boundary conditions (scope and space), and 2) definitional robustness. 
A primary goal of signaling theory is to reduce the amount of information asymmetry by 
effectively communicating the quality of information (Spence, 1973; Connelly et al., 2011). 
This is accomplished by the signaler sending signals that enact the receiver’s perception of 
costliness (Spence, 1973; Connelly et al., 2011). However, in terms of scope, signal opacity 
is not “costly” by definition, meaning the receiver interprets a signal’s quality by the 
perceived cost incurred by the sender, but rather is perceived as components of costliness, 
such as honesty, credibility, or commitment (Spence, 1973; Connelly et al., 2011). For 
example, new ventures that align themselves with reputable third parties or who are able 




third party costs. This means that a stakeholder will find the signal credible (and thus cost) 
based upon its affiliation with a reputable third party (Plummer, Allison, & Connelly, 2016).  
Signal opacity is not costless, also known as “cheap talk,” which refers to information 
that is of low quality and is not easily verifiable (Crawford & Sobel, 1982). Costless signals 
are based on opinions or emotions and thus are easily faked and may be seen as low-quality 
signals by receivers (Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Anglin, Short, Drover, Stevenson, McKinney, 
& Allison, 2018). Examples of these costless signals may include smiling to portray positive 
psychological capital (hope, confidence, and resiliency); generosity towards the signal 
receiver; and visual symbols such as formality of dress, meeting settings, and staging of 
props. (Clarke, 2011; Gambetta & Székely, 2014; Centorrino, Djemai, Hopfensitz, Milinski, 
& Seabright, 2015; Anglin et al., 2018). However, signal opacity should also not be fully 
transparent since the signaling environment dissuades a signal receiver from proceeding 
through the verification process. Transparent signals exist in a distortion-free environment 
where information is symmetric and verification is of low cost. Diplomas as a costly signal of 
education (Spence, 1973) and audited financials as a costly signal of performance 
(Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002) are examples of transparent signals. Investors prefer these 
signals since the cost-benefit and expected payoff from basing decisions on this information 
is highly skewed in their favor (Quek, 2016). However, many new ventures simply don’t have 
those preferred transparent signals. For this reason and as explained in this clarification, signal 
opacity is an effective strategy in gaining new venture legitimacy.  
In terms of context or space, a standard debt contract setting, such as a borrower-lender 
relationship, is an ideal environment for examining the existence and nature of signal 




for new ventures (e.g., Rutherford, 2015). Extant research finds that debt contracts rely on 
the entrepreneur maintaining organizational control and exerting the predominant amount of 
effort (e.g., De Bettignies, 2008). Theoretically, signal opacity would be most effective when 
the signal sender (new venture) is primarily in control of all positive and negative 
information that is shared with outside parties (bank). A venture capital relationship differs 
from banks in the degree of effort and information that both parties share. For example, 
venture capitalists require extensive monitoring of daily firm activities, while banks are 
concerned with collateral quality and financial reporting, usually on a quarterly or annual 
basis (Winton & Yerramilli, 2008). Venture capitalists may also hold seats on the firm’s 
board of directors to implement more control over firm decisions (Kaplan & Stromberg, 
2001). Literature shows that banks are more amicable to a broader range of venture types, 
while venture capitalists focus primarily on riskier investments that have a probability of 
greater returns (e.g., Sahlman, 1990). In relation to the strategic choice of which investor to 
seek, Ross (1977) finds that debt contracts improved the value of firms due to the exclusion 
of debt payments in computing corporate tax income. Moreover, contrary to the layman’s 
belief, bankers are reasonably motivated to eschew active judgment and instead engage in a 
more passive process. 
Table 1. External Sources of Finance Used to Establish Startups 
Source Population Percentage 
Bank Loan 20.4 
Friends/Family Loan 12.7 
Mortgage on Home 6.5 
Other Credit 4.7 
Other External Sources 4.6 
Credit Card 3.3 
Venture Capital Equity 0.3 
Source: Adapted from DeBettignes (2008) and Fraser (2005).  
Note: These numbers refer to the subset of SMEs (businesses 
with less than 250 employees) that are defined as startups 





Significant attributes within signal opacity align with existing constructs found in 
literature. Camouflaged signals, which include: 1) overcomplicated language, which 
increases information asymmetry; and 2) unorthodox writing styles (distortion) to confuse 
the reader, were examined as new ventures strategies used to persuade investors that they 
were legitimate. (Benson, Brau, Cicon, & Ferris, 2015). The coercive isomorphism and 
ceremonial conformity constructs were developed to express the process of adhering to 
societal norms by adopting valued practices of their constituents (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). 
In a similar vein, multiple variations of the mimicry construct were explored, such as the 
process of manipulating one’s outward appearance or maintaining eye contact to be 
perceived legitimate (Gambetta, 2005). In terms of costs, signals were examined through the 
cost-benefit analysis of fabricating a signal and found that high-quality sellers were those that 
used costly and difficult-to-verify signals (Mavlanova, 2012). Based on these existing 
constructs with similar attributes, the definition of signal opacity is the strategic leveraging of 
signals that mimic a transparent signal, but that influence the signal receiver to bypass the 
active, sociopolitical judgment process due to its opaque nature. In the following, a review of 
institutional and signaling theory is utilized to further develop and support signal opacity. 
A Review of Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory provides a rich stream of literature that spans numerous research 
disciplines. It is imperative in this study to provide a historical summation of the overall 
themes of institutional theory in order to evaluate its evolution towards the modern view of 
legitimacy judgments. As such, there have been numerous contributions to the theory that 
instigate its evolution, such as a focus on the habits and behaviors of institutions as a 




embodiment of moral views (Ayers, 1952). Institutions are regarded as “taken for granted” 
establishments that abide by social norms (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and as structures of 
formal and informal guidelines that influence political, economic, and social decisions 
(North, 1989). To provide an efficient and thorough review of this literature, I will focus on 
disciplines with dense streams of institutional research. In the literature review by 
Weerakkody, Dwivedi, and Irani (2009), institutional theory was found to be prominent in 
management, sociology, political science, and economics journals. In accordance with these 
findings, I will focus the review within these subjects and detail its evolution into 
management literature’s modern view of legitimacy judgments. 
Old and New Institutionalism 
In the seminal works by DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997), 
institutional theory is reviewed across two categories of research: old and new institution-
alism. The importance behind this work was not only the historical and analytical review of 
institutional theory, but also a “reconciliation” or “bridge” between the two streams of 
thought (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997). In the following review of the literature, I will explore 
old and new institutionalism within sociology, political science, and economics journals to 





Table 2. Sample of Seminal Articles in Old Institutional Theory 
Field Article Key Concepts 
Sociology 
Durkheim (1922) Examines the administrative, coercive and intelligent functions 
of institutions through a political sociology lens.  
Weber (1949) Examines social phenomena such as religion from a rationalist’s 
point of view. Views institutions as social establishments; 
focuses on influence of charismatic leaders.  
Selznick (1957) Institutionalization as a fluid process that occurs over time. To 




Institutions as a social order filled with actors that perform 
repeated actions that are subjectively interpreted. 
Economics 
Veblen (1899) Views institutions in terms of consumption, firm control, 
performance strategies, marketing, and economic cycles.  
Mitchell (1924) Explores the behavior of institutions in the production of goods 
and the pursuit of money along with economic business cycles. 
Commons (1924) Expresses that institutions are comprised of “collective action” 
and “collective will” where behavior is unconscious and 
consequences unplanned. 
Ayers (1944) Focuses on technology as the primary vehicle for institutional 
evolution and economic prosperity. 
Political Science 
Wilson (1898) As a leader of the progressive movement, attempts to alter the 
institution of the U.S. government away from a partisanship. 
Holmes (1909) Examines common law as an institution and provides basis for 
an empirical approach for future research. 
Downs (1957) Examines the rational actor in political parties and the strategies 
used to gain greater firm performance or election. 
Etzioni (1963, 
1975) 
Classification of institutions by their use of power to influence 
members (coercive, utilitarian, and normative) and their 







Table 3. Sample of Seminal Articles in New Institutional Theory  
Field Article Key Concepts 
Sociology  
Meyer & Rowan 
(1977)  
Explores rationality within organizations, such as through 
shared beliefs as taken-for-granted.  
Zucker (1977, 
1983)  
Examines institutionalization in terms of the subjective and 
objective conformity of cultural norms by actors. 
DiMaggio & 
Powell (1983)  
Explores conformity among institutions through coercive, 
mimetic, and normative isomorphism. 
Economics 
Coase (1937, 1960)  Explores institutional partnerships and the influence of 
transaction costs on firm behavior.  
North & Thomas 
(1973)  
Explores institutionalism as property, specifically the 
influence of property rights on western economic prosperity. 
Williamson (1975, 
1985)  
Views institutions as vehicles of innovation and individual 
choice as impenetrable by the external environment.  
Schotter (1981)  Instills game-theory as a framework for his argument that 
societal norms and routines are important within institutions. 
Grossman & Hart 
(1987)  
Explores contracts and property rights as boundaries of an 
institution during negotiations. 
Eggertson (1990)  Researches the various struggles for managers and 
shareholders of open and closed institutions, such as the 
influence of transaction costs and behavior. 
Political Science 
March & Olsen 
(1984)  
Focuses on values and norms as building blocks of 
institutions. Explores contextualism, reductionism, 
utilitarianism, functionalism, and instrumentalism. 
Moe (1984, 1990)  Explores institutional theory as rational choices and the 
emergence of firms as a functional solution to an economic 
problem. 
Jessop (1990)   Develops “strategic-relational approach” as a method of 
institutional analysis. Examines institutional turn (thematic, 
methodological and ontological).  
 
Sociology 
The stream of institutional research within sociology prior to the Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) seminal article is wholly regarded as “old institutionalism” (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991). The transition from old to new institutionalism was marked at this point due to the 
beginning of a rationalist view of institutions where organizational structures were based on 
formal rules and regulations (Powell & Colyvas, 2007). Prior to this, the sociological 




who examined the administrative, coercive, and intelligent functions of institutions through a 
political sociology lens (Thompson, 2002). This sociological research was quickly noticed 
stateside and was adapted by American scholars (i.e., Selznick, 1957) who discovered that 
organizations frequently deviated from these formal rules and were rather built according to a 
“shadowland of informal interaction” such as cliques and coalitions (Scott, 1987). Also, 
during this time period, sociologists took a macro view towards the theory by incorporating a 
historical and functionalist approach to institutions (Scott, 1987). As an extension of Barnard 
(1938), scholars regarded institutionalism as a process that slowly evolved over time and 
noted that the importance of leadership was to instill an organization’s morals and values 
(Scott, 1987). The Berger and Luckmann (1967) examination of knowledge and society 
discusses the transformation of subjective perceptions into objective facts through social 
constructionism. Social constructionism is best described as how society influences our 
perceptions of information and how it can become engrained as reality for future evaluations 
(DeLamater & Hyde, 1998). This paradigm also details how individuals or groups view 
events in a structured order, finding correlations and patterns that are shared in society 
(DeLamater & Hyde, 1998). This notion is expanded further into gender and sexuality, 
evaluating the role of attraction and sexual orientation within biological theories of 
preference (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). 
The new institutionalists of sociological literature broke away from the social norms and 
values of old institutionalism and focused on how organizations leverage cognitive processes 
and schemas as legitimizing processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). New institutionalism 
was built on a theory of action, meaning the historical and functionalist viewpoints of old 




change (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Meyer and Rowan (1977) expand on this work by 
focusing on the institutional processes of mimicking norms built within our society to gain 
legitimacy. This notion of gaining legitimacy includes resource funding, increased stability, 
and survival in a hostile environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Their work also details how 
institutions follow normative and cognitive rules accepted by society and thus may be given 
legitimacy by decision makers regardless of their organizational efficiency (Starbuck, 1976). 
Scholars explored the processing of homogenizing with similar reputable organizations to 
gain legitimacy by describing coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms of institutional 
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This was a contribution to the works of Meyer 
(1979) and Fennell (1980) and their development of competitive and institutional 
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This work was important in understanding how 
institutions could strategically change or morph to gain legitimacy. For instance, through 
coercive isomorphism, institutions respond to political or regulative pressures to adhere to 
specific organizational standards (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Institutions employ mimetic 
isomorphism to overcome environments of high uncertainty by modeling previously 
legitimized structures or behaviors (March & Olsen, 1976). Lastly, firms adopt normative 
isomorphism as a form of “professionalization,” which based the granting of legitimacy 
through formal education and professional networks (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Political Science 
Peters’ (1999) review of institutional theory within political science literature provides an 
in-depth approach towards the evolution of political institutions. In his discussion on the 
relationship between institutional theory and political science, Peters (1999) elaborates on the 




values) structural component to provide a setting for societal interactions is imperative to the 
growth of institutions (Peters, 1999). Second, institutions provide stability and can be 
leveraged as a method of predicting individual behavior (Peters, 1999). Third, institutions 
exist due to the mutually shared values of individuals, which uncover the overlap between 
these different streams of literature (Peters, 1999).  
Early scholars (i.e., Wilson, 1898) led the Progressive Movement with a focus on 
reforming the institution of the United States government by ending partisanship and adding 
additional layers of regulation (Peters, 1999). From a theoretical sense, old institutionalism 
brought about a positivist approach, such as through legalism and the notion that laws and 
regulations are a product of human choice and should be treated in themselves as institutions 
(Peters, 1999). A second theoretical development of the era includes the importance of 
structuralism and its reliance on a formal doctrine, such as the U.S. Constitution, to 
determine changes in political institutions (Peters, 1999). Criticisms of these ideas center on 
its existence in underdeveloped countries that lacked a formal doctrine (Almond & Coleman, 
1960). Another approach in old institutionalism was holism, which involves scholars taking a 
macro approach to comparing political systems rather than specific branches of government 
(Peters, 1999). However, this approach creates difficulty in comparative analysis and theory 
development, especially within whole political systems from multiple countries (Dogan & 
Pelassey, 1990). Old institutionalists also relies on a historical approach to understanding the 
development of political institutions (Peters, 1999). An interesting tenet of this era is the 
relationship between socio-economic influences and a change in political institutions. Rather 
than a unilateral effect, old institutionalists theorize that society and the State have a mutual 




The new institutionalist era in political science began with the March & Olsen (1984, 
1989) seminal works reinvigorating a normative rather than coercive approach to institutions. 
This approach coincides with old institutional sociological theory by focusing on 
organizations’ formal makeup of norms and values in affecting its ultimate choices (Peters, 
1999). Scholars stipulate the importance of routines and rules stating, “Institutions have a 
repertoire of procedures and they use rules to select among them” (March & Olsen, 1989, pp. 
21-26). Unlike the new institutional sociological focus on cognition in determining 
behavioral patterns, political science scholars and their normative approach view institutions 
as influencing individuals’ rational choices (Peters, 1999). An important illustration detailing 
this approach is that of soldiers choosing to march in the face of imminent death by 
“behaving” in accordance to the norms instilled by their institution of government (March & 
Olsen, 1989). A criticism of new institutional political theory is that scholars of this period 
were attempting to dissuade the central political tenets found in new institutional sociological 
and economic theory and “save” their approach (Peters, 1999).  
Economics 
The old institutional economists viewed institutions as collections of moral beliefs and 
habitual behaviors (Ayers, 1952; Veblen, 1922). The notion that the economic man (Veblen, 
1919) is that of “a lightning calculator of pleasures and pain,” and it solidified the stance that 
neoclassical theory was flawed in its maximization of opportunities (Scott, 2008). Scholars of 
this period (i.e., Veblen) were proponents of economic change and strove to understand why 
technological innovations occur (Scott, 2008). They viewed institutions as structures of habit 
where knowledge and behavior passed down through sociological functions were essential to 




derived from legalism, was discussed as an optimal unit for economic analysis (Commons, 
1924; Rutherford, 2001). Also, banks were explored as institutions, such as their role with 
various for-profit organizations that operated in the “money economy” (Mitchell, 1924). This 
sparked research in understanding the behaviors of organizations within the business cycle 
(Mitchell, 1924; Mitchell, 1996; Rutherford, 2001).  
With a focus on the relationship between transaction costs and benefits, new institutional 
economists elaborate on the role of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and verification 
costs by asserting that institutions provide a reliable framework for economizing behavior 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). As an extension of Coase’s (1937) theory that institutions exist 
as a means to lower transaction costs and increase benefits, research evaluates the role of 
opportunism (self-interest) within institutions (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Hodgson, 1989). On 
the other hand, many institutionalists of this era contrast with these cost-saving practices by 
sharing similar views of neoclassical economists, such as institutions’ goals to “maximize 
utility” (North, 1981; Parada, 2003). This argues that organizations act as feedback processes 
to guide individuals to make rational choices; however, due to the subjectivity in their 
information processing, transaction costs are highly volatile (Parada, 2003).  
Institutional Theory and Management  
Institutional theory within the management research framework embodies a marriage of 
the sociological, political, and economic theories developed within old and new 
institutionalism. To integrate these historical and seminal notions within modern 
management literature, this review will examine the strategy of gaining legitimacy as well as 
the process of granting legitimacy judgments within institutional theory. This is particularly 




may be leveraged through isomorphism to effectively enact passive legitimacy perceptions of 
stakeholders. 
New Ventures and Isomorphism 
The study of institutions at the organizational level provided an overlap of cultural norms 
and regulatory frameworks (Scott & Meyer, 1983). As stated in the DiMaggio and Powell 
(1991, p. 9) introduction, institutions were no longer necessarily the “outcomes of purposive 
actions,” but were considered products of cognitive and cultural norms. This is not to say that 
the tenets of rationality were no longer evident, since organizations still complied with 
homogenous industry standards, however the notion of “taken for granted” practices became 
a predominant topic also (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). This brought about the exploration of 
strategic initiatives in gaining legitimacy through isomorphic processes of employing formal 
institutional rules and standards rather than being aware of environmental demands (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). Two perspectives associated with isomorphism exemplify strategic initiatives 
employed by new ventures in gaining legitimacy.  
First, from a substantive perspective, new ventures comply with formal expectations and 
practices, such as adhering to expected performance standards (Nord, 1980). These 
expectations may be a product of either economic, political, or legal forces and are a 
necessary evil in the continuation of firm survival (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). As an extension 
of the sociological perspective of institutions, new ventures assume coercive isomorphism, 
which coincides with the notion of rational myths and that firms must adhere to previously 
approved industry rules and standards in order to gain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). This may include producing formal business plans using sophisticated technology 




isomorphism, such as hiring personnel with formalized education or participating in 
professional networks (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). When uncertainty is high and goals are 
ambiguous, new ventures will mimic industry-approved behavior through “modeling,” or 
mimetic isomorphism, in order to appear legitimate (Cyert & March, 1963; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  
Second, from a symbolic perspective, new ventures may offer “surface isomorphism” 
(Zucker, 1987, p. 672) so as to appear valid with norms and values (Richardson, 1985). For 
instance, firms practice ceremonial isomorphism, which is the adoption of highly regarded 
practices from an outsiders perceptive; however, the private mission of the firm is unchanged 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). From a legitimacy perception standpoint, symbolic isomorphism 
poses an accuracy problem since ambiguity and information asymmetry exists (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  
New Ventures and Legitimacy 
Existing research seeks to bring clarity to the legitimacy construct by analyzing 
legitimacy-as-property, as-process, and as-perception (Suddaby et al., 2017). This is 
particularly important in understanding how signal opacity is processed by stakeholders and 
the existence of passive legitimacy perceptions.  
Legitimacy-as-property, or of value and substance, is built upon Weber’s (1968) 
examination of traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal legitimacy. This research confirms 
that legitimacy is a measurable construct and spawned the Aldrich & Fiol (1994) 
development of sociopolitical and cognitive legitimacy and Suchman’s (1995) cognitive, 
moral, and pragmatic legitimacy typologies. An interesting tenet in this research is the 




ideas comply with formal procedures promoting optimal operations, while later-stage firms 
employ isomorphic tendencies to attain cognitive legitimacy (Tolbet & Sucker, 1983). This is 
evident when new ventures attempt to model successful firms by offering similar ideas or 
products in an effort to gain legitimacy. This is also found at the individual level where those 
who experience success are prone to being the subject of mimetic isomorphism as other 
individuals attempt to gain legitimacy by modeling legitimized backgrounds (Fligstein, 
1987).  
Legitimacy-as-process views organizations through a format of change and evolution 
through persuasive narrative techniques (Nielson & Rao, 1987). These microprocesses 
leverage sensegiving and sensemaking through the use of strategic rhetoric and framing to 
attempt to influence legitimacy perceptions (Benford & Snow, 2000; Lawrence & Phillips, 
2004, Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). This process is also found to engage action and 
emotion to enact a “schemata of interpretation” for individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, 
and label” signals (Goffman, 1974, pp.21).  
Legitimacy-as-perception builds upon the subjective judgments found in the 
microprocesses of cognitive legitimacy and the collective sensemaking found in social norms 
(Suddaby et al., 2017). Within this tenet, decision makers developed a “judgment scale” that 
compares the item of interest with current attitudes (Sherif and Hovland, 1961). These 
decision-maker attitudes act as anchors of judgment, meaning the closer in proximity that the 
items of interest fall with the anchor, the higher chance for acceptance (Suddaby et al., 2017). 
An interesting distinction of legitimacy-as-perception is the fact that it is regarded as an 
individual-level process, and not a collective consensus (Bitektine & Haack, 2015). 




individual schemas to act as a representation of what items they deem as legitimate (Bandura, 
1986; Bitektine & Haack, 2015). Also, the behavior of the subjects in accordance with social 
norms takes on a symbolic presence for decision makers to analyze (Bandura, 1986).  
New Ventures and Passive Legitimacy-as-Perception 
Legitimacy-as-perception has been explored in literature as either an active or passive 
process (Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011). Signal opacity will enact a passive evaluation by 
prompting stakeholders to access validity cues and perform visual conformity to social 
norms. Existing research builds upon social psychology literature in heuristics and biases to 
explain why stakeholders choose between the active and passive processing paths (Bitektine, 
2011; Tost, 2011). The following discusses the overlap between these automatic processes of 
the human mind in evaluating information found in signals and eventual legitimacy 
perceptions. 
During an active evaluation, stakeholders exert a higher level of mental processing effort 
by basing the information received according to an “institutionally prescribed” set of social 
norms (Suchman, 1995; Bitektine & Haack, 2015). This is comparable to the system two 
process where signals exist on a recursive path, requiring constant modification and 
reassessment (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). From a processing path perspective, literature 
attempts to elaborate on active processing as the ability to absorb signals through a process of 
signal acquisition, assimilation, and transformation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Cohen, 1991; 
Peake & D’Souza, 2015). This is the appropriate evaluation method when ventures are able 
to send transparent signals. To illustrate, an investor acquires a signal by observing and 
listening in order to extrapolate pertinent information. They then attempt to fully understand 




the newly assimilated information with existing knowledge to eventually form a judgment 
(Peake & D’Souza, 2015). 
Since the central tenet of this study is that signal opacity within an environment of high 
information costs will enact passive processing, the absorptive capabilities of a passive 
decision maker will theoretically end at the signal acquisition stage. This is due to the fact 
that when the decision maker proceeds through the assimilation and transformation phases, 
the cognitive mind is actively and objectively processing the information within the signal 
and reassessing judgments (Peake & D’Souza, 2015). A passive processing path will 
theoretically bypass the assimilation and transformation path by instead relying on validity 
cues or compatibility with social norms to expend less cognitive energy and arrive more 
quickly at a legitimacy judgment.  
Heuristics and Biases 
Passive processing of signals have been explored through the use of heuristics and biases 
(Table 4). Extending Simon’s (1957) work on bounded rationality, the social psychology 
literature has produced at least two important streams of research on heuristics and biases in 
judgment decision making. The first originated with the Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
seminal work on heuristics and biases detailing both the availability and representativeness 
heuristics. Availability refers to the cognitive process of determining the probability of a final 
outcome based on the frequency of a similar past occurrence (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
For instance, availability occurs when a stakeholder assumes that a new venture in the 
technology sector will fail simply because other numerous new ventures in the same sector 
failed in the past. Representativeness describes an individual’s utilization of minimal 




1974). This is accomplished by an individual’s willingness to base generalizations on 
specific traits, such as a firm’s owners or customers, and compare with their own personal 
experiences to make a probability assumption (Busenitz & Barney, 1997).  
The second stream of literature was developed within the finance literature by Gigerenzer 
(1996) as a contribution to the Tversky and Kahneman model (Gigerenzer 1996; Forbes, 
Hudson, Skerratt, & Soufian, 2015). Working with various co-authors, Gigerenzer formulates 
a simplistic viewpoint of recognition by focusing on the calculative ability of the mind to 
make quick decisions (Forbes et al., 2015). Numerous approaches, such as fast-and-frugal 
reasoning, are introduced that incorporate cue variables as a mechanism to accomplish three 
rules: search, stop, and decide (Gigerenzer, 1996; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009). For 
instance, an emergency medical doctor who is quickly reacting to cues utilizes this approach 
when assessing whether a patient is suffering a heart attack. This approach has evolved 
within the financial analysis and data mining field as an algorithm known as the fast-and-
frugal decision tree. Criticisms of this approach are based around the notion of excessive 
overconfidence in results and relying heavily on a probabilistic viewpoint (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1996). Other approaches that focus on recognition and evaluation include take-the-
best heuristic (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). This approach followed the similar “three 
rules” of fast-and-frugal, but differ as it analyzes and values alternatives in a hierarchical 
order before making a final decision (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). For instance, 





Table 4. Sample of Articles on Heuristics and Decision Making 
Field Article Key Concepts 
Psychology 
Simon (1955)  Explores human behavior as causation, social processes, 
motivation, and rationality. 
Tversky & Kahneman 
(1974) 
Representiveness, availability, and adjustment heuristics and 
affiliated biases.  
Kahneman & Tversky 
(1996) 
Response to Gigerenzer’s critique in regard to systematic 
biases.  
Kahneman & Frederick 
(2002) 
System 1 and System 2 processes to represent intuitive and 
reflective cognition. 
Gigerenzer (2007) An examination of intuition and how better decisions are often 
made with less information. 
Lipshitz & Shulimovitz 
(2007)  
Explores intuition and emotion in decision making in the form 
of affect heuristics.  
Finance 
Shanmugam & Bourke 
(1992) 
Applies the representiveness heuristic to credit analysis. 
Identifies multiple biases. 
Kahneman & Riepe 
(1998) 
Studies overconfidence, optimism, and hindsight as cognitive 
illusions in financial decision making.  
Levie & Gimmon (2008) How investors utilize heuristics and biases to choose specific 
signals and cues that promote capital gain.  
Lucey & Dowling 
(2005) 
Studies the affect heuristic and how investor feelings influence 
decision making. 
Baklouti (2015) Examines loan officer judgments based on heuristics and 
emotional intelligence. 
Management 
Schwenk (1984) Summary of cognitive simplification methods used in strategic 
decisions.  
Schwenk (1985) Develops a process model to promote a commitment to a 
course of action by utilizing representiveness. 
Wright & Anderson 
(1989) 
Examines subjective probability judgement processes using the 
anchoring heuristic.  
Busenitz & Barney 
(1997) 
Focuses on representiveness in the decision-making processes 
of entrepreneurs and managers.  
Hodgkinson et al. (1999) Finds that framing bias is a factor in decision making under 
uncertainty and using cognitive mapping.  
Zacharakis & Meyer 
(2000) 
Examines availability heuristics as a method for investors to 
efficiently screen opportunities.  
Wickham (2003) Conducts a conjoint experiment utilizing the representiveness 
heuristic to examine new ventures.  
Dane & Pratt (2007) Develops model of intuitive decisions finding that learning and 
development of schemas are effective. 
Maxwell et al. (2011) Angel investor’s use of heuristics to pair-down excessive 
number of opportunities to analyze. 






study that tested police officer’s use of heuristics to determine which of a group of homes 
would be subject to burglary (Garcia-Retamero & Dhami, 2009). 
These two streams of research on heuristics and biases provide a thorough understanding 
of how passive and quick decisions can be effectively utilized within the framework of this 
study. In the following review of signaling theory, the strategy of leveraging signals to gain 
legitimacy will be developed. 
A Review of Signaling Theory 
Signaling theory captures the process of overcoming a disequilibrium of information by 
signaling high cost and creating greater certainty (Spence, 1973). In the review by Connelly 
et al. (2011), signaling theory is broken down into a timeline of actors and events. The 
signaler is the catalyst for the problem of information asymmetry since the knowledge he/she 
possesses is unavailable to outsiders (Spence, 1973; Kirmani & Rao, 2000; Connelly et al., 
2011). The signal can contain both positive and negative information and can be used 
strategically by individuals and organizations to manipulate the perception of signal receivers 
(Connelly et al., 2011). The receiver possesses the handicap of information and must have 
the wherewithal to accurately decipher the signals as honest or deceitful (Bliege-Bird et al., 
2005). Since signal opacity may consist of a multitude of variations (third party affiliations, 
religious community involvement, shared trauma, existing short-term debt, etc.), it is 
imperative to review signaling theory across various subjects within literature.  
Anthropology 
Within anthropology literature, three classifications of signals are examined (Smith & 
Harper, 1995). The first, self-reporting signals, includes positive and/or negative information 




Smith & Harper, 1995). The second, other-reporting signals, is comparable to the previous, 
but refers to others and not the self (Hasson, 1994; Smith & Harper, 1995). Lastly, a cue or a 
response to the environment is not necessarily considered a signal, but can evolve into one 
based on actions following the response (Hasson, 1994; Smith & Harper, 1995). The 
classification of these signals is examined based on cost as well. A minimal signal is one that 
depicts a cost-free or low-cost signal, such as through a mated male and female where 
conflict no longer is evident (Smith, 1956). A cost-added signal is at a higher cost than the 
minimum signal because higher quality signalers are sending them (Smith & Harper, 1995). 
Interestingly, this doesn’t necessarily benefit the receiver as it does the sender, such as 
female toads choosing the male that sings the loudest (Arak, 1988). An index physically 
depicts the quality of the signal, such as spiders vibrating their webs to signal their weight to 
other competing spiders (Riechert, 1978). 
As an extension of these classifications, research details three methods of displaying, 
known as the runaway approach, the sensory-exploitation view, and the costly signaling 
approach (Fisher, 1930). The first two examine how signal preferences of the receiver are 
based on innate genetic traits, thus mate selection is be based on specific evolutionary 
guidelines (Fisher, 1930). However, these two approaches also discuss that signalers 
attempting to stand out from the competition could exploit these preferred signals of the 
receiver (brighter colors or longer tails) and manipulate their decision structure (Bliege-Bird 
et al., 2005). The costly signaling, also known as the handicap approach, refers to honest and 
reliable signals that communicate ability, such as an antelope communicating stamina to a 





Signaling theory has also been examined through the lens of religion as a method of 
communicating intentions, such as through religious behavior and dress (Sosis & Bressler, 
2003). For instance, the distinct turbans and beard lengths of members of the Sikh religion or 
the Haredi garb of Orthodox Jews are distinct signals that represent views and preferences 
(Sosis & Bressler, 2003). The levels of cost within religious signals are discussed, finding 
that tattoos or involvement in ceremonies communicates difficult-to-fake signals that are 
regarded with greater certainty by the receiver (Rappaport, 1999). An interesting point 
regarding religious signaling is the debate between private and group involvement and a 
signal receiver’s perception of cost. Sosis and Bressler (2003) find that convincing a receiver 
by signaling private rather than group commitment carries greater weight due to the 
elimination of false signalers that could “ride on the coat tails” of others. Also, the social 
bonding that is evident within religious sects promotes cooperation where falsely signaling 
can be uncovered through a lack of collective action from an individual (Sosis & Alcorta, 
2003). Other costly signals of religion are found in the initiation activities of many groups. 
For instance, beatings, isolation, and death threats are extreme examples of these costly 
signals (Glucklich, 2001). 
The study of religion and signaling theory uncovered the conversation between 
manipulation and deception (Cronk, 1994). An interesting example is that of a religious 
society attempting to convince and convert other secular communities (Cronk, 1994; Sosis & 
Alcorta, 2003). If their intentions are cooperative, then the religious signals will be 
unassuming and simple (Cronk, 1994). However, if the sect is attempting to convince and/or 




with manipulation (Cronk, 1994). A primary distinction is that manipulation can include 
honest and dishonest signals; however, deceit primarily involves a lack of morality or 
dishonesty (Cronk, 1994). 
Economics 
A large proportion of economics and finance literature integrates “game theory,” which 
refers to the ability to alter preconceived notions about information such as through 
negotiations (Von Neumann, 1944; Nash, 1951). An interesting tenet of this research finds 
that individuals will not alter their original course of action even after becoming aware of 
their opponents chosen strategy (i.e., Nash equilibrium) (Nash, 1951; Gibbons, 1997). Later, 
these approaches are integrated into signaling games, which examine an individual’s choice 
of communication strategy when they are in possession of private information such as 
through negotiations and bargaining power through first offers (Rubenstein, 1982; Gibbons, 
1997).  
Spence’s (1973) economics paper on job market signaling and hiring decisions under 
uncertainty is highly regarded as a seminal paper across multiple streams of literature 
(Connelly et al., 2011). This theory explores costly signaling through an applicant’s 
education as a signal of ability that improves uncertainty (Spence, 1973). This approach is 
also explored within finance, such as signaling firm value by altering liabilities from equity 
to debt, since debt payments are not included in tax calculations (Ross, 1977). Private 
information is examined within auction settings where information asymmetry is created 
between auction bidders and agents (Vickrey, 1961). Also, incentives within signaling theory 
examine the power of private information and how managers are able to manipulate a firm’s 




1977). This notion is further discussed on product quality and uncertainty, finding that when 
agents possess the entirety of information of a poor quality product, they may have more 
incentive to market since the profit margins would be greater (Akerlof, 1970). However, 
from a long-term relationship view, this is found to have dire consequences on trade when 
true product quality is discovered (Riley, 2001).  
Consumer Psychology 
Within consumer psychology literature, a product’s unobservable quality is examined 
through signaling, such as through longer warranty lengths as a signal of high quality 
(Boulding & Kirmani, 1993). Also, the perception of costs incurred by a signaler is found to 
have high signaling power of quality, such as through high advertising costs spent by a seller 
(Super Bowl advertising space) (Kirmani, 1990). These strategies of signaling quality bring 
about concerns of receivers misinterpreting and choosing the wrong signal (Kirmani & Rao, 
2000). Known as adverse selection, research find that this problem is evident within 
precontractual settings due to a scarcity of available information (Kirmani & Rao, 2000). 
Within postcontractual settings, moral hazard is found to be a culmination of the buyer’s 
ultimate revelation of true product quality (Kirmani & Rao, 2000). Since signal opacity exists 
primarily as a method of attaining stakeholder legitimacy prior to funding, the signals are 
leveraged in a precontractual setting. Therefore, it makes sense that stakeholders will be 
concerned with adverse selection and choosing to legitimize the wrong signaler. However, 
within this study’s setting of debt contracts, adverse selection is not exclusive to only signal 





The Connelly et al. (2011) extensive review of signaling theory details its evolution and 
future directions across multiple subjects, including entrepreneurship. Scholars explore an 
entrepreneur’s pursuit for growth by leveraging legitimacy-creating activities via signals 
(Suddaby et al., 2017). For instance, new venture signals, such as board structure and 
makeup, may be utilized to communicate firm performance in the pricing of initial public 
offerings (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). Entrepreneurs have also been examined through 
their ability to create social ties and alliances. Prestigious ties and third party affiliations are 
significant to investors in overcoming information asymmetry with new ventures (Gulati & 
Higgins, 2003; Plummer et al., 2016). Also, firm owners who have equity or “skin in the 
game” signal commitment to  investors (Prasad, Bruton, Vozikis, 2000), but do not 
necessarily suggest future success of the venture (Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2005). Within 
the scope of this study, understanding how signals can be leveraged to acquire investor 
interest is particularly important. As such, a detailed examination of new ventures and their 





Table 5. Sample of Seminal Articles on Signaling Theory 
Field Article Key Concepts 
Anthropology 
Fisher (1930) Runaway Approach, Sensory-Exploitation View, Costly 
Signaling Approach are discussed as methods of signaling 
Riechert (1978) Examines the costly signaling of spiders showing quality. 
Louder web vibrations signal a heavier and dominant spider. 
Arak (1988) Notion that higher quality signalers can afford to send costly 
signals. Exemplified by the mating call of toads. 
Hasson (1994) Signals of fitness displays are costly within the prey/predator 
analogy. Also mimicry and camouflage are possible, such as 
antelopes kicking to portray fitness. 
Smith & Harper 
(1995) 
Review of animal signal classifications, including self-reporting 
and other-reporting signals, minimum cost, cost-added, and 
index signals. 
Bliegebird et al. 
(2005) 
Examines signaling through generosity as a form of honest 
communication. Elaborates on Fisher’s (1930) classification 
methods. 
Religion 
Cronk (1994) Response to Rappaport (1999) detailing morality and manipula-
tion in signaling. Argues that manipulation includes honest and 
dishonest signals, but morality is more associated with signaler 
intent. 
Rappaport (1999) Was a strong proponent of religious rituals as unfalsifiable 
costly signals. Also expressed that information that is unverified 
objectively is verified emotionally, such as through experiences. 
Glucklich (2001) Unfavorable initiations that involve pain as a costly signal. 
Sosis & Alcorta 
(1994) 
Examines costly signals such as rituals and sacrifices. Also 
discusses deception, finding that complexity of behaviors and 
aggressiveness signal deception. 
Sosis & Bressler 
(2003) 
Explores the evolution of religious signals as costly displays. 
Examples include religious dress and commitments not publicly 
accolated as costly signals. 
Finance & 
Economics 
Vickrey (1961) Examines signaling in auction settings where agents possess 
information (bids). Creates competition within bidders through 
speculation. 
Akerlof (1970) Explores signaling product quality in the auto industry. Finds 
that managers are incentivized to sell poor quality products due 
to higher margins. 
Spence (1973) Examines signaling in the labor market. Finds that education is a 
costly signal of quality to hiring manager. 
Ross (1977) Examines signals of firm profitability through choice of debt 
versus equity structure. Also finds that managers possess private 
information and leveraged incentives based on this. 
Bhattacharrya 
(1979) 
Company dividends act as signals to outside investors of optimal 
cash flow. The extent of dividend is correlated to investor 
horizon. 
Gibbons (1997) Game theory within economics explored as a signaling game in 
four variations (static, dynamic, complete, and incomplete 
information). 
Riley (2001) Review of signaling theory within economics. Discusses 




Field Article Key Concepts 
Consumer 
Psychology 
Kirmani (1990) Advertising costs examined as a signal of product quality. 
Perceptions resemble “U” shape with high costs producing 
negative perceptions of quality. 
Boulding & 
Kirmani (1993) 
Explore warranty lengths of products as signals of quality. The 
longer the warranty, the higher the perception of quality 
Kirmani & Rao 
(2000) 
Examine communicating product quality through firm signaling. 
Problems associated with information asymmetry are adverse 
selection and moral hazard. 
Rupp & Mallory 
(2015) 
Environmental information such as treatment as a signal of CSR 
and reputation. 
Gond et al. (2017) Review of microfoundations of CSR. Explore signaling and 
CSR within the scope of job seekers through social exchange 
mechanisms. 
Entrepreneurship 
Fischer & Reuber 
(2007) 
Theorize that reputation formation of new ventures should be of 
importance prior to seeking investors. 
Bruton et al. (2009) Examine adverse selection and moral hazard within IPO 
offerings. Results suggest that retained ownership in venture 
augment adverse selection. 
Cornelissen et al. 
(2012) 
Signals in the form of speech and gesture as metaphors are 
frequently incorporated by new ventures to gain cognitive 
legitimacy. 
Osmel et al. (2013) The ability of new ventures to gain access into syndicate of 
investors is reliant upon their existence in other nonaffiliated 
networks. 
Van Werven et al. 
(2015) 
Examine persuasion arguments used by entrepreneurs to plead 
legitimacy (analogy, classification, generalization, cause, signs, 
and authority). 
Plummer et al. 
(2016) 
New venture characteristics are magnified when signaled to 
investors when they are affiliated with third parties. 
 
New Venture Costly Signaling and External Capital 
A new venture is an organization that exists in the early stages of a business life cycle 
(Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). These young firms are faced with a legitimacy barrier in the 
eyes of stakeholders due to liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and liability of 
smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). Literature explores signaling tactics that new ventures 
are able to leverage to overcome these barriers, such as the development of legal entities or 
providing formal business plans (Karlsson & Honig, 2009). In the following, I will discuss 




External capital sources for new venture financing has been a topic of interest in 
signaling literature (Bruns et al., 2008; Berger & Udell, 1998, 1999). Although scholars have 
expanded on numerous funding options for new ventures, including venture capital (Kaiser et 
al., 2007), crowdfunding (Mitra, 2012), angel investors (Huang, 2018), and bootstrapping 
(Rutherford et al., 2017), I will focus primarily on the issuance of debt as an appropriate 
financial vehicle. I discuss here why a debt contract is relevant within the theory of signal 
opacity. 
First, a debt provider such as a commercial bank is liable to a high level of information 
asymmetry in which the control and flow of information is highly skewed towards the 
business owner (Bruns et al., 2008). This is due to the fact that debt contracts rely on the 
entrepreneur to maintain organizational control and exert the predominant amount of effort 
(De Bettignies, 2008). However, information asymmetry is not a liability for all investors ― 
venture capitalists and angel investors―who provide short-term funding in return for equity 
in new ventures (Kaiser, Lauterbach, & Verweyen, 2007). With a percentage of business 
ownership, VCs and angels work alongside new ventures to aid in operations and decision 
making, which dramatically balances the level of effort and information asymmetry (Fassin 
& Drover, 2017). Second, debt contracts are a relevant and timely option within the theory of 
signal opacity due to their popularity and availability among new ventures. (Fraser, 2005; De 
Bettignes, 2008). Third, as shown in Table 6, a rich stream of literature exists surrounding 
signaling and the financing of informationally opaque businesses with debt contracts. 
Existing research discusses the role of relationship banking as a tactic to overcome an 
investor’s level of information asymmetry (Peterson & Rajan, 1994; Berger et al., 1999). 




by gathering pertinent data through third-party affiliations, reputation within the community, 
and relationships with other businesses (Berger et al., 1999). For this reason, my sample will 
include bankers that employ relationship banking as a tactic when making business decisions. 
Table 6. Sample of Articles on Signaling and External Debt 
Field Article Key Concepts 
Economics 
Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) Debt financing with imperfect information. Interest rates 
as effect screening device.  
Diamond (1989)  Small firms access to external capital at each life cycle 
stage. 
Baas & Schrooten (2006)  Relationship banking can supersede the need for hard 
financials to make lending decisions. 
Cosh, Cumming & Hughes 
(2009) 
Characteristics of firms seeking external capital. Assets 
were a strong predictor for debt. 
Banking 
Ulrich & Arlow (1981) Survey of loan officers on factors affecting decision 
processes.  
Berger & Udell (1998)  Informationally opaque firms must overcome costly 
verification and adverse selection. 
Berger & Udell (2001) Evaluated barriers to credit availability to 
informationally opaque firms.  
Ambrocio & Hasan (2019) Measure of discretion to test if lenders tried to gain 
private information about borrowers.  
Finance  
Cole, Goldberg, & White 
(2004) 
Smaller banks tend to rely more on borrower's character 
than formal financial variables.  
Ueda (2004)    Firms may choose to not partner with VC for fear of 
losing intellectual property or control. 
Robb & Robinson (2012) Outsider debt in the form of bank loans was the choice 
of external capital for new firms. 
Management 
Chaganti, DeCarolis, & Deeds 
(1996)  
Economic need and personal choice as a predictor for 
debt financing. 
DeBettignies & Brander (2007) Equity is preferred over debt only if there is a 
managerial value-added component. 
Moro, Fink, & Kautonen (2014) Voluntarily disclosing information to a loan officer 
influenced perception of competency.  
 
Hypotheses Development 
The Strategy of Costly Signaling and Opacity 
In developing and understanding the hypotheses as they relate to signal opacity, I needed 
to first detail the strategy of costly signaling. Here I examine the theory of an equilibrium 
within costly signaling and notate how the theory of signal opacity should be evaluated from 




further detail within the theories of separating and pooling equilibriums and how high- and 
low-quality signalers are interpreted. I also examine signaling as a top-down or goal-oriented 
process so as to shed light on signal opacity as a strategy, not a fortunate accident. Also, from 
the stakeholder’s point of view, I will discuss the bottom-up or stimulus-driven process of 
making sense of signals to explain how this strategy (top-down) is effective. Lastly, I will 
discuss the appropriate setting for this theory within the realm of a new venture signaling to 
external stakeholders. 
Costly Signals and a Pooling Equilibrium 
Separating and pooling equilibria were originally discussed in the exploration of high- 
and low-quality firms marketing products to consumers (Kirmani & Rao, 2000). 
Subsequently, this research was extended, exploring the separating equilibrium as a 
mechanism that differentiated between high- and low-quality signal senders (Bergh et al., 
2014). An important distinction in this theory is the understanding of costs and quality. Bergh 
et al. (2014, p. 1337) state that in a separating equilibrium: “The costs of credible signals are 
inversely related to the quality of the sender. Low-quality senders – such as the lower-quality 
worker ‒ must invest at a level disproportionately higher than high-quality senders to convey 
the same signal of high quality.”  
As shown in Figure 1, a high quality firm should choose to signal since the benefits are 
much larger than not (A > B); however, a low-quality firm should not choose to signal 
because falsely signaling quality will ultimately have a negative effect (D > C). This creates a 
separating equilibrium allowing the signal receiver to decipher which firm is of higher 
quality since a low-quality firm will not falsely send signals of quality (Kirmani & Rao, 




such as when an investor is deciphering the quality of a new venture, then a pooling 
equilibrium may occur (Kirmani & Rao, 2000).  
Figure 1. Signals and Quality (Kirmani & Rao, 2000)  
 Signal Do Not Signal 
High-Quality Firms A B 
Low-Quality  Firms C D 
 
Within the realm of entrepreneurship, a new venture should not be considered as low-
quality in the sense that they are “inadequate” in regards to becoming profitable in the future, 
but rather that they lack the ability to provide transparent (easily verifiable) signals that 
verify historical profitability and future ability to produce a sufficient net income to pay the 
principal and interest requirements of the debt contract. From a separating equilibrium view, 
since a new venture lacks these transparent signals, they are instantly perceived as of low 
quality when compared to the signals of mature firms. Although this seems to be a correct 
formulation, there may be an alternative viewpoint where new ventures are able to attain 
legitimacy when competing against each other rather than mature firms. This viewpoint 
resembles a scenario where a pooling equilibrium is expected, which can create a difficult 
assessment for the investor (Bergh et al., 2014). In the case of a pooled equilibrium, investors 
must then leverage their own expertise to decipher a subjective appraisal of quality (Drover, 
Wood, & Corbett, 2018). The new venture that is successful in gaining investor legitimacy is 
the one that leverages signal opacity to achieve stakeholders’ perceptions of higher quality in 
an environment of similar costs. Thus, it is argued that signal opacity exists beyond the 
separating equilibrium, which is known as a pooling equilibrium (Bergh et al., 2014, p. 
1353): “Within a pooling equilibrium, all signalers offer the same signals and the receiver is 




for groups of different quality. Under such conditions, one cannot prevent low-quality 
providers from imitating the signals of high-quality providers when the former benefits from 
doing so.” 
A second distinction of separating equilibrium is the Bergh et al. (2014, p. 1338) 
discussion on the role of penalty costs for false signaling. For instance, when managers 
increases their share ownership stake in firms, they are signaling a positive outlook in firm 
performance (Bergh et al., 2014). If they were falsely signaling this outlook, the hefty price 
in accordance with purchasing additional shares would dramatically affect their personal 
liquidity (penalty costs). However, this is not applicable to a pooling equilibrium since signal 
opacity is not leveraged to deceive stakeholders with completely false information, but rather 
to manipulate investors to not fully verify signals so as to appear as higher quality. As 
discussed earlier, manipulation, unlike deception, can involve honest and credible signals 
(Cronk, 1994). This is an important distinction when discussing the continuity of long-term 
relationships. For instance, in the case of false signaling, if an investor later discovers that 
blatant deception occurred (fabricated financials, forged documents, counterfeit passports 
and identification cards), the relationship may be fully marred. However, in the case of signal 
opacity (patent filing counts, business plans, social ties, etc.), the surface-level quality is 
actually honest; and since the onus to fully verify is on the investor, the underlying quality of 
the signal is not deceiving, but a manipulation of information.  
Another interesting tenet of separating equilibrium is the element of signal confirmation. 
This states that a separating equilibrium is achieved based on the subsequent experience of 
the signal (Bergh et al., 2014). For instance, investors may only acknowledge high- and low-




applicable to signal opacity because the signals are not meant to be fully confirmed or 
verified after the fact. They exist in the precontractual stage of a transaction and lower 
stakeholders’ perception of adverse selection by affecting the quality level. Figure 2 
illustrates the process model of signal opacity and a pooling equilibrium. Due to the receivers 
inability to discern a distinction of new venture signal quality based on cost in a separating 
equilibrium, they determine quality utilizing heuristics on the passive processing path in a 
pooling equilibrium. To further detail and examine the strategy of signal opacity, I will also 
detail the dual process (top-down versus bottom-up) of new ventures signaling for external 
capital and investors interpreting and appraising the quality of new venture signals for 
potential opportunities. 
Figure 2. Process Model 
 
Costly Signaling as a Top-Down Process 
Literature explores the processing of signals as either a top-down or bottom-up processes 
(Posner, 1980; Shepherd, McMullen, & Ocasio, 2017). To attract the attention of a receiver, a 
signal must be sent with a purpose, especially when the signal’s context is highly subjective 
and susceptible to numerous perceptions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). As previously 
mentioned, signals from a new venture exists in a pooling equilibrium where quality is 




attention, new ventures must utilize a top-down approach, which is a goal-driven and 
stimulus-creating process (Ocasio, 2011). For instance, new ventures are intentional in their 
signal choice to investors based on their preferred outcome once the signal is received. 
Literature explores signaling theory as a top-down process where signals are manipulated in 
an effort to frame meanings and create contextual effects (Celani & Singh, 2011). Signal 
observability is a key tenet within this notion, due to consensus that regardless of whether 
receivers are actively looking for the signal, its observability will have an effect on receivers’ 
level of attention (Connelly et al., 2011). This top-down approach has also been explored 
from an attentional control perspective, theorizing that signals are able to manipulate 
receivers’ backward- and forward-looking processes (Ocasio, 2011). For example, a new 
venture that signals prior industry experience or social ties can create signals that promote 
future success.  
Passive Legitimation as a Bottom-Up Process 
From a strategic point of view, utilizing a top-down approach is most effective when the 
signal receiver has a bottom-up perspective (Drover et al, 2018). The bottom-up or stimulus-
driven process focuses on exogenous stimuli that enacts a passive or heuristic-driven 
attention process (Drover et al., 2018). This means that a signal receiver responds to signals 
as they are observed. In terms of new venture-seeking stakeholder funding, a debt contract is 
an appropriate financial vehicle that may instill a bottom-up approach. Within this theory, the 
stakeholder’s (banker) role is as a service provider fielding loan requests from new ventures 
and appraising risk levels based on information sent. Since a pooling equilibrium exists due 
to homogenous signal cost levels across new ventures, stakeholders find difficulty in 




a reflexive manner, choosing to utilize heuristics to base decisions. An interesting tenet from 
literature is the relationship between the bottom-up process and signal observability. This 
research finds that signals with lower observability are less likely to be processed utilizing 
bottom-up (Drover et al., 2018). This is applicable with this theory since signal opacity will 
be highly observable due to its ability to balance the levels of information asymmetry by 
utilizing costly characteristics of honesty, credibility, and commitment. Once stakeholders 
appraise the cost to verify and the level of distortion, they choose to process by bottom-up. In 
the following, I will detail each of the hypotheses. 
Hypotheses 
Signal Opacity 
Signal Honesty, Credibility, and Commitment 
Information asymmetry is a core component of signaling theory focusing on the fact that 
“different people know different things” (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 469). Reducing information 
asymmetry by communicating the quality of information through signals of honesty, 
credibility, and commitment is a vital process within signaling theory (Spence, 1973; 
Connelly et al., 2011). By alleviating some level of ambiguity, signal receivers are able to 
effectively observe and appraise the cost of signals before making judgments (Busenitz et al., 
2005; Gomulya & Boeker, 2014).  
However, overcoming information asymmetry is a difficult obstacle for receivers. 
Management and finance literature examines the information asymmetry relationship with 
adverse selection and moral hazard due to the potentially opportunistic behavior of signal 
senders (Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Within the context of the entrepreneur-




evident than moral hazard to occur in the precontractual stages of negotiation (Mavlanova, 
2012). When there is a potential for information to be misrepresented and one party has 
control of its validity, stakeholders are faced with determining the few good opportunities 
from the numerous bad (Leland & Pyle, 1977). To lower this chance of adverse selection, 
stakeholders search and process specific signals sent by entrepreneurs that are regarded as of 
high quality to bring greater balance to the lopsided state of information asymmetry. Within 
this theory, these specific signals do not necessarily bring complete equilibrium to the high 
level of information asymmetry in the signaling environment, but rather allow the 
stakeholder to overcome the initial problem of adverse selection. This is because signal 
opacity will initially capture stakeholders’ attention by resembling a signal with costly 
attributes (honesty, credibility, and commitment) (Spence, 1973; Connelly et al., 2011). 
Because of this, stakeholders will feel less concerned they are proceeding with a poor 
signaler (adverse selection) and will attempt to actively process the signal. However, as 
discussed, one of the main tenets of this theory is that once stakeholders realize the signals 
carry high levels of distortion and verification costs, they will still proceed and rather process 
the signal on a passive path.  
Distortion 
Signal opacity is also determined by its level of distortion, which is comprised of: 1) the 
observability of the signal, and 2) the noise caused by the signaler’s behavior or other 
external referents (Connelly et al., 2011; Gomulya & Mishina, 2017). Existing research 
explores signal intensity (Gao, Darroch, Mather, & MacGregor, 2008) and clarity (Warner, 
Fairbank, & Steensma, 2006) to clarify a signal’s observability as its strength or level of 




of this construct asserts that if a signal is unnoticed due to its lack of clarity or strength, then 
the chance that a receiver will act upon the signal is severely diminished (Connelly et al., 
2011; Anderson & McMullen, 2012). This is highly applicable within the theory of signal 
opacity since the signal must first and foremost catch the receiver’s attention by having 
costly attributes such has honesty, credibility, and commitment. 
Noise has been described in literature as an exogenous condition that influences the 
signaling environment, thus affecting a signal’s observability (Rynes et al., 1991; Connelly et 
al., 2011; Anderson & McMullen, 2012). A key question in regard to signal noise is how the 
process can be leveraged as a strategic tactic. Multiple theoretical discussions within 
management and finance literature have researched signal noise as a tactical play for 
entrepreneurs within the entrepreneur-stakeholder dyad (Graffin, Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011; 
Plummer et al., 2016). Camouflaged signals in the form of overcomplicated language or 
unorthodox terminology in documents were found to be a highly persuasive technique for 
entrepreneurs seeking investment (Benson et al., 2015). Also, timing the release of positive 
and negative information or entrepreneurs’ anticipatory obfuscation of signals suggested their 
ability to control a stakeholder’s reaction (Elsbach, 1998). Leveraging external referents, 
such as third-party affiliations, was found to be an effective tactic for entrepreneurs to 
differentiate themselves in an otherwise noisy signal environment of similar ventures 
(Plummer et al., 2016). Finally, intentionally sending signals that focus primarily on positive 
aspects to overshadow the negative, such as the scalability of venture or an optimal market 





Existing literature finds empirical evidence that distortion in a signaling environment 
significantly affects investors’ perceptions of signals (Yao et al., 2019). As mentioned earlier, 
the initial observability of a signal is paramount to instilling an investor’s reaction to the 
signal’s importance (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Yao et al., 2019). When distortion enters a 
signaling environment, such as a bear financial market for investors, a lucrative contract 
signing by a venture can serve as a highly observable signal that can outweigh any other 
negatives (Yao et al., 2019). Distortion can also include behaviors or viewpoints of other 
signalers (Connelly et al., 2011). From a strategic view, a signaler may choose the timing of a 
signal’s release based on overall performance of its competitors as a distorting factor (Janney 
& Folta, 2006). If a market is bullish, then an investor may overlook the negative factors of a 
new venture based on its competitor’s success. Under the same veil, ventures that are 
competing for investment capital may leverage a rival’s inconsistent performance as a 
distortion tactic to gain a competitive advantage (Yao et al., 2019).  
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant difference between a stakeholder’s perception of 
legitimacy due to the levels of signal opacity. 
Information Verification Costs 
As previously discussed, a central tenant of signaling theory in management and finance 
literature is the dyadic effort to bring balance to an otherwise imperfect level of information 
asymmetry by signaling to the receiver that a high cost was incurred to send the signal 
(Spence, 1973; Connelly et al., 2011). However, this only partially accomplishes the goal of 
costly signaling due to the fact that the information verification cost incurred by the signal 




the question: if the information cost for the receiver exceeds the expected benefits of 
verifying, is the costly signal worthless?  
Information verification costs have been a topic of interest within literature on signaling 
costs through intellectual rights such as patents (Hayes, 1999; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2002; 
Long, 2002). These verification costs may include hiring experts and attorneys or simply 
equate to the time expended in performing firm due diligence (Long, 2002). The central tenet 
in this research finds that a venture’s patent and/or patent counts serve as costly signals of 
quality to investors due to its investment of capital and R&D (Long, 2002; Hsu & Ziedonis, 
2008). This research also finds that investors concerned with opportunism and attempting to 
verify the dense information found in patents are able to pass a bulk of the verification costs 
on to other reputable authorities (Long, 2002). For instance, a new venture that has compiled 
numerous patents must comply with regulations of the Patent Trademark Office (PTO) and 
make honest statements or claims about their patents (Long, 2002). If ventures are deceitful 
and intentionally deliver false statements or claims, the substantial upfront investment of 
capital and time will be ultimately forfeited (Long, 2002). Investors are aware of this and 
thus are able to transfer a bulk of the costs in verifying honest statements about the patent to 
the PTO. This is highly applicable to signal opacity due to the fact that from an investor’s 
point of view, the credibility of a signaler and the honesty of its signal is verified by a 
reputable third party (the PTO), and thus the investor doesn’t need to assume this already 
sunk cost. At this point in the precontractual transaction, the investor has not incurred any 
real costs in verifying the quality of the signal. Thus they are not overly concerned with 




The benefit-cost scale swings once the investor begins to fully verify the signal. For 
instance, in the case of patents, Long (2002) examines the cost distinction between verifying 
the quantity and quality of signals. Obviously, the cost of verifying the quantity of patents in 
a portfolio is much less than verifying its quality (accuracy). Thus, the investor, who in this 
case has already verified a signal’s credibility through the sunk costs of a third party, must 
choose to either incur a very high cost to verify its accuracy or a much lower cost to verify 
the quantity (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000; Long, 2002). If investors choose to incur the 
high verification cost and find that a patent is inaccurate, they must then expend more costs 
to prove that the inaccuracy is material and was intentional in order to recoup their initial lost 
capital (Grossman, 1981; Long, 2002). Since a breach of good faith or “inequitable conduct” 
may be difficult and costly to prove in a court of law (Long, 2002), literature finds that 
focusing on a signal’s credibility may be a more cost-effective option (Certo et al., 2001; 
Sanders & Bovie, 2004; Busenitz et al., 2005; Connelly et al., 2011).  
Within the realm of signal opacity, signalers are able to signal their credibility to 
investors through the sunk costs of another party. The investor chooses to not actively verify 
the signal further due to the fact that information costs will exceed the benefit, and a very 
important attribute of the signal (credibility) has already been verified. Also, investors realize 
that if they choose to incur high information costs to actively verify the signal and uncover 
inaccuracies, they must then sustain even greater costs to prove the inaccuracies were 
intentionally deceitful to recoup their original investment. Signalers may be aware of this 
quandary and choose to send specific opaque signals that exist in a signaling environment of 
high information costs where credibility can easily be verified through the sunk costs of 




evaluation process and exist within the signal environment, the variable is proposed 
separately from signal opacity. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant difference between a stakeholder’s 
perception of legitimacy due to the levels of signal verification costs. 
Interaction of Signal Opacity and Information Verification Costs on Legitimacy 
In this study, I propose that an interaction occurs between signal opacity and verification 
costs that will enhance or reduce the variable’s main effect on stakeholder legitimacy 
perceptions. This means that business owners’ ability to capture stakeholders’ attention and 
create distortion may be affected by the amount of information verification costs in the signal 
environment. In a similar vein, business owners’ ability to influence passive legitimacy 
judgments of stakeholders through high verification costs may be influenced by how 
effectively they can initially capture their attention and create distortion. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a significant difference between a stakeholder’s 
perception of legitimacy due to the interaction between signal opacity and 
signal verification costs. 
Receiver Expertise 
As signals are received, the interpretation process can be significantly heterogeneous 
across audience groups (Kim & Jensen, 2014). The Heil and Robertson (1991) study on 
competitive market signals finds that signal receptivity, which consists of the expertise level 
of the signal receiver and their domain-specific experiences with similar signals, were 
influential in their ability to interpret. At the microfoundational level, expertise can be 
especially complex in the investment field since individual members of an investment team 




Receiver expertise considers the accuracy of interpreting information based on the 
receivers’ relevant knowledge or skill levels (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987; Argote, 1999). 
Literature examines this construct, finding that experts in a field have a greater understanding 
of the ambiguous qualities of signals due to their industry knowledge and ability to complete 
complex analysis (Ocasio, 1997). Johnson and Russo (1984) find that individuals with higher 
expertise perform effective information searches and efficiently translate cryptic signals. 
Bruns et al. (2008) explore loan officer expertise within the banking industry, remarking that 
credit guidelines only solve part of the problem in determining the credit worthiness of a 
borrower. They remark that the final approval determination is primarily based on the loan 
officers’ expertise level and overcoming information asymmetry (Bruns et al., 2008).  
Dane and Pratt (2007) contribute to research on intuitive decision making in their 
research on “expert” schemas, which is described as highly complex and domain-specific 
schemas (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). These expert schemas are developed by individuals 
through explicit and implicit learning (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Explicit learning involves the 
conscious improvement of an individual’s knowledge base through three types of practice: 
duration, repetition, and feedback (Dane & Pratt, 2007). This gives decision makers “domain 
specific” content that can be applied when viewing signals that are difficult to verify. On the 
other hand, implicit learning describes an individual’s unconscious accrual of patterns of 
knowledge retained (Reber, 1992; Dane & Pratt, 2007). As noted by Prietula and Simon 
(1989), individuals who have leveraged explicit and implicit learning are able to develop 
domain-relevant schemas (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Building on Simon and Chase’s (1973) study 
on the ability of chess masters to visually recognize thousands of strategies utilizing familiar 




explicit and implicit learning. As discussed previously, expert schemas utilize heuristics to 
make decisions when the entirety of information is currently unavailable (Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 1986; Dane & Pratt, 2007). This is accomplished by recognizing patterns of 
information, such as through signals, and utilizing past experiences and expertise to make 
decisions (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Huang, 2018). In a similar vein, Klein (1998) explores the 
acknowledgment of cues based on comparable information store in individuals’ memories 
through their recognition-primed decision models. As discussed previously in the research by 
Dane and Pratt (2007), passive processing of information requires ample prior experience to 
allow for timely decision making (Klein, 1998).  
Hypothesis 4a: The difference between a stakeholder’s perception of 
legitimacy due to the levels of signal opacity is significantly enhanced when 
stakeholder expertise is high and reduced when it is low. 
Hypothesis 4b: The difference between a stakeholder’s perception of 
legitimacy due to the levels of signal verification costs is significantly 
















In this chapter, I discuss the methodological procedures utilized for data collection, 
measure development, and analysis to empirically test this study’s hypotheses. To 
develop an instrument to quantitatively assess and analyze the effect of signal opacity, I 
initiated an exploratory sequential mixed methods research design. Commonly regarded 
as the “third methodological orientation,” this design leverages the use of qualitative and 
quantitative analysis to explore and answer the focused research question(s) (Teddlie, 
Tashakkori, & Johnson, 2008). Within an exploratory design, qualitative data is initially 
collected to organically build upon preliminary findings and eventually transition towards 
a quantitative analysis (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2011). Unlike concurrent research 
designs that examine data from many different viewpoints to uncover themes, such as 
triangulation, sequential designs utilize gathered data to instigate further data collection 
and analyses (Myers & Oetzel, 2003). The use of this research design is appropriate due 
to this study’s reliance on transforming subjective data into objective findings. As shown 
in Figure 4, the qualitative and quantitative research designs for this study were split into 
two sequential phases (Myers & Oetzel, 2003). Phase One illustrates the qualitative data 




Two depicts the quantitative data collection and analysis utilized to answer this study’s 
research questions. 
Selection of Qualitative Study Participants  
In contrast to the use of random sampling in quantitative studies, data collection using 
qualitative methods relies on purposive recruitment to further theoretical perspectives 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 40). As an extension of this premise and to develop specific 
“signals” to be utilized in the main study, banking experts (N = 10) and business owners (N = 
10) were intentionally recruited for face-to-face interviews. Literature suggests that a 
minimum sample of 15 is acceptable in data collection of this type (Bertaux, 1981). 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval detailing the anonymity of the study and 
participants’ rights were attained prior to recruiting subjects for this study. Banking experts 
and business owners were recruited by leveraging the professional network of the researcher. 
Participants were selected using a sufficient amount of inclusionary and exclusionary detail 
to ensure a robust collection. This included a minimum of ten years of experience for the 
bank experts and five years of experience for business owners. The stricter experience 
requirement for bank experts was due to the study’s focus on banker judgments as the 
outcome variable. The full scope of the research study was not divulged during the 
qualitative stage, so as to not bias quantitative results in the main study. Therefore, bankers 
participating in the qualitative portion of this study were given the option to participate in the 
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Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis 
Qualitative Data Collection 
Qualitative research designs utilizing interviews have been criticized due to their 
subjective nature and difficulty in ensuring the validity and reliability of findings (Arbnor & 
Bjerke, 1997). To address these issues and in accordance with guidance from extant 
literature, the interviews in this study were semistructured but consistent, using questions 
similar to those found in previous research. As an illustration, “tell me about a new venture 
that you invested in (didn’t invest in)” as well as techniques to promote story-telling, such as 
“and then what happened next?” (Spradley, 1979; Huang, 2018) were included in 
questioning. Also, to ensure the trustworthiness of the findings, each interview was 
intentionally lengthened, lasting a minimum of 30 to 45 minutes (Teddlie et al., 2008). 
Literature has suggested the validity of qualitative data is enhanced when grounded in 
existing theory (Swinton & Mowat, 2006). In accordance with this suggestion, a preliminary 
review of extant literature was performed prior to the interviews to uncover potential signals 
that would potentially align within the hypothesized criteria. As shown in Table 7, this 
preliminary list spanned across multiple streams of literature emphasizing the broadness of 
this construct and ability to be applied in various facets. This review was leveraged to 





Table 7. Preliminary List of Potential Signals 
Year Author(s) Journal 
Literature 
Stream Costly Signal Opaque? Explanation 
2002; 2015 Long; Hoenig & 
Henkel 
University of Chicago 







Yes Provisional patent counts signal product 
quality. However, provisional patent fees 
can be as little as $65 for a micro entity. 
A large number of valid provisional 




Certo et al.; 
Filatotchev & 
Bishop; Mitteness, 
Baucus, & Norton. 
ET&P; Strategic 
Management Journal; 




Board of Directors / 
TMT 
Yes Board composition, board reputation, 
board leadership, board size. Theranos 
utilized their board makeup to gain 
legitimacy and funding without a viable 
product.  
2016 Plummer et al. Academy of 
Management 
Management 3rd Party 
Affiliations 
Yes Memberships in highly reputable organ-
izations signal quality. However, there is 
effort and information costs for a verifier 
to meet with high ranking officials of the 
organizations to verify levels of 
leadership and engagement. 
2001 Wang, Chua, & 
Megginson 
Working Paper Finance  Confidentiality 
Agreement 
Yes Signals that the intellectual property is of 
enough value that confidentiality is 
required. However, this can be used as 
"smoke in mirror" to portray value when 
















Yes Existing short-term debt signals that due 
diligence on the firm has been performed 
since debt holders must renew the note on 
a regular basis. However, many large 
banks offer smaller unsecured business 
lines of credit through a simple online 
approval process without much of due 
diligence. Making small purchases and 
paying off each month builds business 
credit. 
2005 Busenitz et al. ET&P Entrepreneurship Sweat Equity Yes Signals value in the firm. Can be signaled 




Year Author(s) Journal 
Literature 




et al.; Nagy, 
Rutherford, & 
Lohrke. 
Quarterly Journal of 







Yes Education is a costly signal to the 
investor to require a devotion of time and 
money. However, online certification 
courses can be completed in a short 
period of time, such as courses in finance, 












Review; Journal of 
Business Venturing; 




Human Capital Yes Founder's family reputation, age, 
education, prior self-employment. 
Applies to employees of the firm as well. 
2006; 2014; 
2015 
















Yes Provides potential for investor disap-
pointment if they are inaccurate. 
However, supplying projections signals 
the owner has an understanding of their 
product and market. 
2013 Utset Boston College 
Review 
Business Law Corporate Signals Yes Reinvesting retained earnings (reduces 
owner distributions) and paying a 
dividend (reduces free cash flow) signals 
the company is in strong financial 
position and committed to growing. 




Management Hiring Auditors Yes Exemplifies to investors that there is a 
second layer of quality control in place. 
However, the business may still be at an 
infant stage not yet requiring the due 




Year Author(s) Journal 
Literature 
Stream Costly Signal Opaque? Explanation 
2009; 2015 Rutherford, 
Bueller, & 




ET&P; Academy of 
Management; Industry 
and Higher Education 
Entrepreneurship; 
Management; OB 
Social Ties Yes Within nascent markets, forming 
influential ties can signal leadership, 
convey a unique identity and disseminate 
stories that reinforce an identity. 
2013 Phillips, Tracy, & 
Karra. 
Journal of Business 
Venturing 
Entrepreneurship Religion & Values Yes Utilizes homophily or shared identity to 
build tie portfolios (relationships). 
Philanthropic 
2013 Phillips et al. Journal of Business 
Venturing 
Entrepreneurship Shared Trauma Yes Utilizes shared adversity or hardships 
experienced. 




Political Science Self-Regulation Yes Principals might be more likely to 
provide resources if the company is part 
of a regulatory program. However, 
regulatory programs  are of variable 
quality and, in some cases, could be 
designed to obscure rather than reveal 
information. 







Yes Unfavorable financial forecasts are 
deemed credible. Opens the possibility 
that projecting positive returns for a 
startup is perceived as more credible if 
part of those projections include 
unfavorable early years. 
2004; 2009; 
2009; 2012 
Delmar & Shane; 
DeClercq; 









Entrepreneurship Business Plan Yes The development of a business plan 
brings regulative legitimacy. However 
even though the information presented 
may be based on historical industry 
figures, they are projections and not a 
firm prediction of outcome. 
2007 Millett & Dewitte Journal of Research in 
Personality 
Psychology Altruistic Behavior Yes Unconditional altruism shown as an 
honest signal of intelligence. 
2004; 2009 Delmar & Shane; 
DeClercq 




Entrepreneurship Business License Yes The issuance of a business license signals 





Year Author(s) Journal 
Literature 
Stream Costly Signal Opaque? Explanation 
2000 Prasad Venture Capital Entrepreneurship Proportion of 
Owner Net Worth 
Invested  
Yes An owner's net worth or shareholder level 
signals commitment in the firm. Signifies 
"skin in the game". 
1992; 2004; 
2005; 2012 
Bruderl et al; 
Delmar & Shane; 
Busenitz et al.; 
Nagy et al. 
American Sociological 





Industry Experience Yes Signals the owner has potential for 
success due to knowledge of industry 
requirements, reputation in the field and 
an understanding of potential pitfalls. 
2002; 2006 Zimmerman & 




of Economic Behavior 
& Organization 
Management; OB Existing Customer 
Contracts 
Yes Existing accounts receivable signal others 
have legitimized this company. However, 
a potential investor would need to 
analyze these customer financials to gain 







The primary purpose of the interviews with business owners was to extend pre-defined 
categorical themes by asking them to recall signals that they had intentionally sent in various 
contexts anticipating they would not be verified. Examples of interview questions included, 
“tell me about a time that you gave information about you or your company and you were 
confident of how they would perceive it” and “what do you feel are the most important 
characteristics a banker looks for in a new venture.” Similarly, the banking experts were 
asked to recall signals in various contexts where they chose not to actively process their 
decisions, but rather move forward passively with impartial information. As the interviews 
continued, these questions too became gradually more focused upon the debt financing 
context. Examples of interview questions included, “tell me about a time when you approved 
a loan with insufficient collateral” and “what do you feel are the most important 
characteristics of a new venture when evaluating credit risk.”  
Acknowledging and overcoming bias was an important concern at this stage of the study. 
First, this portion of the study was prone to selection bias due to the researcher’s familiarity 
with the business owners, but was mitigated by including business owners and bankers in the 
sample that were unfamiliar to the researcher (Tech, 2018). Second, participant bias was 
examined to ensure the interview questions were not probing or leading, but rather open-
ended allowing the interviewee to answer freely and not feel compelled to respond in a 
specific direction (Galdas, 2017). Third, researcher bias was avoided by considering all 
obtained data regardless of its content (confirmation bias) and refraining from asking study-
focused questions at the beginning of the interview (question-order bias) (Chenail, 2011). A 





After completion, interviews were transcribed and analyzed utilizing deductive content 
analysis to uncover potential signals within flagged statements made by interviewees 
(Boyatizis, 1998; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). In contrast to inductive analysis, which is used when 
knowledge is highly fragmented and new, broad categories must be identified in qualitative 
data; deductive analysis is appropriate when a general knowledge base exists. This base is 
then leveraged to utilize the existing broad categories to increase specificity (Boyatizis, 1998; 
Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). Therefore, the purpose of the analysis here was not to explore and 
generate new categories, but to match data found within the completed interviews to 
grounded theoretical categories from extant literature and stated within the study’s 
hypotheses.  
To develop a coding scheme for the analysis, specific statements from the interviews 
were isolated and matched to hypothesized categories (information asymmetry, distortion 
and information verification costs) using definitions from the grounded theory. Literature has 
suggested to enhance the reliability of qualitative data, the findings at each stage should be 
repeatedly evaluated and compared using impartial subjects (Silverman, 2013). In accordance 
with this, pilot tests were executed to improve upon the coding scheme and to isolate the 
hypothesized variables within the categories (signal honesty, signal credibility, signal 
commitment, distortion-signaler behavior, distortion-external factors and information 
verification costs) and match them to flagged interview statements. To ensure content 
validity and reliability of these analyses and to identify high and low statements coinciding 




The inter-rater reliability (see “Findings”) were examined to potentially exclude statements 
that didn’t match prespecified variable characteristics.  
Development of the Survey Instrument 
In accordance with recommended item development practices, I conducted a literature 
review to identify survey items to ensure face validity of the instrument (Rudestam & 
Newton, 2014). This included a review of existing literature to identify applicable items to 
measure each identified variable. I then executed pilot testing with doctoral students to create 
a more robust survey instrument. To ensure the validity and reliability of the variables and 
survey items, I performed a factor analysis (Conway & Huffcut, 2003). I examined the 
variables for multicollinearity via linear regression to determine whether they were highly 
correlated to each other (Conway & Huffcut, 2003). 
An important component of this analysis was to also examine the rotations within the 
pattern matrices of each of the high and low statements identified in the pilot tests. This was 
necessary to identify cases of convergent and divergent validity (Williams, Onsman, & 
Brown, 2010). The variables and measures utilized in the quantitative analysis of the main 
study are detailed below. 
Outcome Variable  
The stakeholder’s perception of legitimacy variable was measured with a single item to 
identify whether the receiver perceived the signaler as legitimate by choosing to move 
forward with the loan request based upon the information provided (Bruns et al., 2008). 
Respondents were asked to “rate the probability that you would support the new venture’s 




item was measured on a seven-point Likert scale anchored by “extremely unlikely” (1) and 
“extremely likely” (7). 
Predictor Variables 
Signal honesty, credibility, and commitment are a specific group of signals that will 
initially capture the signal receiver’s attention by alleviating the imbalanced level of 
information asymmetry between the signaler and receiver (Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Information asymmetry occurs when “different people know different things” 
(Stiglitz, 2002). Signal receivers will focus on signals with these costly characteristics.  
The signal honesty variable captures the degree to which a signal communicates 
information that is perceived as genuine. As honest signalers are confident about their 
signals, they intentionally and forcefully highlight information that supports their signal’s 
quality (Weiler & Weinstein, 1972; Spence, 1973; Bergara, Henisz, & Spiller, 1998; 
Connelly et al., 2011). Respondents were asked to rate the level of high and low signal 
honesty based on a seven-point Likert scale anchored by “strongly disagree” (1) and 
“strongly agree” (7) using the single item, “This information inspires me with confidence” 
(Moussa & Touzani, 2008). The original use of this scale within existing literature reported 
sufficient reliability (α > 0.818) of the item. (Moussa & Touzani, 2008). 
The signal credibility variable pertains to signalers’ reputations through their experiences 
or the believability of statements made by reputable third parties (Weiler & Weinstein, 1972; 
Spence, 1973; Bergara et al., 1998; Connelly et al., 2011). Respondents were asked to rate 
signal credibility based on a seven-point Likert scale anchored by “strongly disagree” (1) and 
“strongly agree” (7) and using the following items to measure high signal credibility: “the 




and low signal credibility, “this information comes from a recognized organization or 
experts” (Moussa & Touzani, 2008). The original use of this scale within existing literature 
reported sufficient reliability (α > 0.818) of the item. (Moussa & Touzani, 2008). 
The signal commitment variable pertains to signalers’ intent or underlying motivation 
behind sending signals. This can be expressed through their statements or actions exhibited, 
which are controlled by the signaler. Commitment can mean to sacrifice or endure hardships 
to meet prespecified goals (Spence, 1973; Bergara et al., 1998; Connelly et al., 2011). 
Respondents were asked to rate the level of high and low signal commitment based on a 
seven-point Likert scale anchored by “strongly disagree” (1) and “strongly agree” (7) using 
the single item, “this information tells me the new venture/founder is willing to put in a great 
deal of effort beyond what normally is expected in order to be successful” (Porter, Mowday, 
& Steers 1979). The original use of this scale within existing literature reported sufficient 
reliability (α > 0.820) of the item (Porter, Mowday, & Steers 1979). 
Distortion may occur within a signal’s environment and will affect observability (i.e., 
clarity, significance) (Kao & Wu, 1994; Warner et al., 2006). Distortion signaler behavior 
includes actions that create noise or disruption, thus making it difficult for receivers to 
ascertain the true quality of signals (Connelly et al., 2011; Gomulya & Mishina, 2017). 
Respondents were asked to rate the level of high and low distortion signaler behavior based 
on a seven-point Likert scale anchored by “strongly disagree” (1) and “strongly agree” (7) 
using the single item, “this information from the founder/new venture would make it difficult 
for us to recognize inadequacies” (Jensen & Szulanski, 2004; Li & Hsieh, 2009). The 
original use of this scale within existing literature reported sufficient reliability (α > 0.84) of 




economic or market conditions and behavior or information from other signalers in the 
environment (Connelly et al., 2011; Gomulya & Mishina, 2017). Respondents were asked to 
rate the level of high and low distortion external factors based on a seven-point Likert scale 
anchored by “strongly disagree” (1) and “strongly agree” (7) using the single item, “this 
external information would often cause disagreements about how we should proceed with the 
new venture” (Carson, Wu, & Moore, 2012). The original use of this scale within existing 
literature reported sufficient reliability (α > 0.74) of the item (Carson, Wu, & Moore, 2012). 
Information verification cost is associated with acquiring knowledge pertaining to 
verifying the accuracy of signals (Choudhury & Sampler, 1997; Yang, Yu, & Lee, 2002; 
Yeoh, 2005). Verification costs may include monetary or time/effort costs. Respondents were 
asked to rate the level of high and low verification costs based on a seven-point Likert scale 
anchored by “strongly disagree” (1) and “strongly agree” (7) using the following items to 
measure high, “to verify this information, I would need to spend time collecting more than 
less data and knowledge”( Choudhury & Sampler, 1997; Lim & Klobas, 2000; Salojarvi, 
Furu, & Sveiby, 2005) and low, “to verify this information, I would need to have a 
significant investment budget in seeking external information and knowledge, such as 
acquiring consulting services from outside experts or subscribing to major journals and 
periodicals related to your industry” (Salojarvi, Furu, & Sveiby, 2005; Yang et al., 2002). 
The original use of these scales within existing literature reported sufficient reliability 
(α = 0.74, α > 0.915) of the item (Yang et al., 2002). 
Moderating Variable  
Stakeholder expertise assesses the accuracy of interpreting information based on the 




Literature shows that experts in various field have a greater understanding of the ambiguous 
qualities of signals due to their industry knowledge and ability to complete complex analysis 
(Ocasio, 1997). Johnson and Russo (1984) find that individuals with higher expertise perform 
effective information searches and efficiently translated cryptic signals. Signal receiver 
expertise measures industry experience by asking respondents to state their number of years 
employed in the banking industry (Bruns et al., 2008). 
Control Variables 
Positive and negative affect coincides with the positive and negative emotions that can 
inadvertently influence decision making. To test for this, the 20-item Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS) was administered to respondents using a five-point Likert scale 
anchored by “very slightly or not at all” (1) and “extremely” (5) (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 
1988). Item examples for positive affect included, “to what extent do you generally feel 
interested” and for negative affect, “to what extent do you generally feel irritable.” The 
original use of this scale within existing literature reported sufficient reliability (α > 0.87) of 
the items (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). The original items also reported sufficient 
convergent and discriminant validity based on factor loading results (Watson, Clark & 
Tellegen, 1988). 
Uncertainty avoidance refers to the propensity to avoid risk and uncertainty when making 
decisions. To test for this, the seven-item Uncertainty Avoidance Scale was administered to 
respondents using a seven-point Likert scale anchored by “strongly disagree” (1) and 
“strongly agree” (7)” (Jung & Kellaris, 2004). Item examples included, “I would not take 
risks when an outcome cannot be predicted” and “I tend to get anxious easily when I don’t 




reliability (α = 0.75) of the items (Jung and Kellaris, 2004). The scale also reported sufficient 
convergent and discriminant validity based on findings from a previous study of the same 
items (Hofstede, 1980; Jung, 2002). 
To control for “age,” respondents were asked to state their date of birth. To control for 
“race,” respondents were asked to state their ethnicity using the categories: white, black or 
African American, American Indian or Alaska native, Asian, native Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander, and other. A dummy variable (1,0) was created to transform each specific race 
classification into a quantitative variable. To control for “gender,” respondents were asked to 
state their gender using the categories: male, female, and non-binary. A dummy variable 
(1,0) was also created for each gender category. 
Selection of Study Participants for Quantitative Analysis  
Banking participants were recruited for the quantitative portion of this study by 
leveraging specific banking industry groups, such as LinkedIn, the Texas Banker’s 
Association, and the Risk Management Association. IRB approval was attained detailing the 
anonymity and participants’ rights prior to recruiting subjects. Although on the surface, the 
sample may be considered nonrandom due to its exclusionary recruitment criteria, the 
selection of participants and responses within industry groups was completely random. To 
increase the probability of finding an effect, a statistical power analysis was performed to 
determine an appropriate number of participants (Cohen, 1992a). Utilizing a conditional 
power calculation with eight predictor variables (two IVs, one moderator, and five controls), 
an anticipated effect size of 0.10, and the ability to achieve a probability level of 0.05, a 




Achieving this power level allows the avoidance of the probability of committing a Type II 
error or failing to reject an objectively false null hypothesis (Cohen, 1992a). 
Quantitative Data Collection and Analysis 
Quantitative Collection 
 
Using a within-subjects design, the quantitative portion of this study began with 
collecting data on the participants’ preferences for passive or active decision-making 
processes. This allowed me to determine whether individuals’ underlying decision-making 
preferences would be altered when faced with scenarios of variable manipulations. After 
providing consent, participants were asked to respond to a 16-item instrument (Betsch & 
Ianello, 2009; Pachur & Spaar, 2015) designed to measure their preferences for active and 
passive processing using the Unified Scale to Assess Individual Differences in Intuition and 
Deliberation (USID) (Betsch & Ianello, 2009; Pachur & Spaar, 2015). Examples of items 
measuring active processing included, ”I want to have a full understanding of all problems” 
and for passive processing, “when I make a decision, I trust my inner feelings and reactions .” 
This instrument was specifically designed to improve upon the weaknesses of the original 
Preference for Intuition and Deliberation scale (Betsch, 2004). For instance, during the factor 
analysis portion of the original PID study, two key factors for intuition (affect and 
automatic/spontaneous) and deliberation (cognition and planned/structured) were identified, 
but were ultimately not included in the final version of the instrument (Pachur & Spaar, 
2015). The improved scale (USID) included these omitted items as well as integrated other 
instrument inventories found in literature that isolated an individual’s use of cognition when 
making decisions (Pachur & Spaar, 2015). The original use of this scale within existing 




items (Pachur & Spaar, 2015). The scale also reported sufficient external validity due to its 
incorporation of previously validated items from literature (Pachur & Spaar, 2015). 
To gather data on the predictor variables, four vignettes were developed and structured 
utilizing existing social science literature as a guide to ensure validity and reliability of the 
analyses (Gould, 1996; Hughes & Huby, 2012) Literature suggests that using short vignettes 
is imperative to keep respondent interest and avoid test fatigue (O’Conner & Hirsch, 1999). 
In compliance with this requirement, each manipulated vignette was kept to a maximum of 
four sentences, allowing for each variable of interest to be included in a separate statement. 
Also, the realism of vignettes is paramount to actively engage readers and peak their interest 
to produce a realistic response (Hughes & Huby, 2012). To comply, banking experts were 
recruited to review the vignettes and appraise their accuracy and realism. Finally, flexibility 
of time allowed for responding was a topic of interest in that asking respondents to read a 
scenario and answer questions under a time restriction was unnecessary and might inhibit the 
quality of results (Stolte, 1994). 
In relation to vignette content, existing literature examines the use of experimental 
manipulation within vignette design (Evans et al., 2015). This is of substantial importance for 
a within-subjects design since conformity of nonmanipulated items must be consistent so as 
to avoid inhibiting the variables of interest (Evans et al., 2015). Since the main study utilizes 
a within-subjects design, the content unrelated to the variables of interest was kept consistent 
for each manipulated vignette. 
In developing the vignettes to be used in conjunction with the developed survey 
instrument, a primary concern was their internal validity. Existing literature holds that 




validated by a panel of experts who have sufficient experience within these scenarios (e.g., 
Gould, 1996). In accordance with these recommendations, peer- and nonpeer-reviewed case 
studies were examined to identify specific lending scenarios to be used within the vignettes 
(Jankowicz & Hisrich, 1987; Wilson et al., 2007; Charter Capital, 2018). Once the vignettes 
were constructed, banking experts were recruited to review the scenarios to validate their 
accuracy and realism. Researchers also recommend that vignettes should be piloted prior to 
implementation to strengthen their internal validity (Hughes & Huby, 2012), I did this prior 
to conducting the main study. This is discussed further in the findings. 
Utilizing a within-subjects design, each participant responded to all four manipulated 
vignettes (High-High, High-Low, Low-High, Low-Low) through a survey instrument 
administered via Qualtrics (Appendix D). Literature finds that a within-subjects design has a 
distinct power advantage over between-subjects designs (Smith, Kassin, & Ellsworth, 1989) 
because each participant is responding to all treatments rather than only one. Within-subjects 
designs also require fewer participants, which aids in lowering the error variance and 
increasing statistical power (Lamb, 2003). To lower the chance of order bias, vignettes were 
randomly counterbalanced to respondents within Qualtrics.  
Following each vignette, respondents were asked to rate their probability of moving 
forward with the loan request. Manipulation checks were also included asking participants to 
rate each specific vignette statement using the applicable item measures previously identified 





Quantitative Analysis  
Interaction Hypothesis 
To evaluate the interaction of signal opacity and signal verification costs on the 
stakeholder’s perception of legitimacy, I performed a one-way repeated measures ANOVA 
using SPSS software. Using this form of analysis is effective when there exists a fluctuation 
in mean values over three or more conditions in a within-subjects design (Krueger & Tian, 
2004). Performing a repeated measures ANOVA also lowers the likelihood of performing a 
Type II error due to its reduction of error from individual differences (Stevens, 2012). Since 
this portion of the analysis included four manipulations of the predictor variables, the use of a 
one-way repeated measures ANOVA was appropriate. 
Of the four ANOVA tests, this study utilized the Pillai’s test, which has been found to be 
the most robust and generally leveraged with the existence of homogenous and 
heterogeneous variances of two variables (Olson, 1974; Ateş, Kaymaz, Kale, & Tekindal, 
2019). A detailed overview of the properties for each of the four ANOVA tests has been 
provided in the table below (Ruiz, 2019). 
Table 8. ANOVA Tests 
 Pillai’s  Wilk’s  Hotelling’s  Roy’s 
Test Stat 
V (𝑠) =  𝑡𝑟((𝐸 + 𝐻)−1 𝐻) Λ =
|E|
|E + H|
 U(𝑠) = 𝑡𝑟 (𝐸 −1𝐻) min (p, q) 



















Robust Yes Yes Yes No 















Main Effect Hypotheses 
A paired samples t-test was performed to evaluate the main effect of signal opacity and 
information verification costs on the perception of stakeholder legitimacy using SPSS 
software. Prior to initiating this analysis, I identified the mean values of each predictor using 
the mean values of the four conditions (Figure 5). For the first predictor variable, I calculated 
the difference between “High Signal Opacity,” column “AC” and “Low Signal Opacity,” 
column “BD.” For the second predictor variable, I calculated the difference between “High 
Signal Verification Costs,” column “AB” and “Low Signal Verification Costs,” column 
“CD.”  
Figure 5. Predictor Main Effects (Rosenbaum, Mama, & Algom, 2017) 
 
Moderator Hypothesis 
To analyze the moderating role of stakeholder expertise on signal opacity and signal 
verification costs, a linear mixed model with repeated measures was performed in SPSS. This 
particular method of analysis is utilized when there is an existence of a within-subjects factor 
(stakeholder’s perception of legitimacy) and a between-subjects factor (stakeholder 
expertise) (Verbeke & Molenberghs, 2012). To perform this, dummy codes for each 
manipulated treatment of the outcome variable were developed (0100 = High-High 
Treatment; 0010 = High-Low Treatment; 0001 = Low-High Treatment; 0000 = Low-Low 
Treatment). The fixed effects, or variables for this hypothesized relationship, were identified 
D











as: (1) dummy-coded outcome treatments, (2) years of banking experience, (3) years of 
banking experience * dummy-coded outcome treatments. The random effects in this analysis 
corresponded with the variability within the sample (Verbeke & Molenberghs, 2012). To 
identify the fixed and random effects, the interaction between the dummy codes and the 
moderator variable were calculated and then regressed onto the moderator, dummy codes and 










In this chapter, I will discuss the qualitative findings used in the survey instrument’s 
development as well as the quantitative findings leveraged to answer this study’s two 
research questions. 
RQ1: How are new ventures able to secure the perception of legitimacy and eventual 
funding when they do not always possess optimal signals comparable to a mature 
firm? 
RQ2: How are stakeholders able to effectively process and evaluate new venture 
signals to make a legitimacy decision when actual quality is difficult to assess due to 
similar costs? 
Following the interviews with banking experts and business owners, I assessed the 
validity and reliability of the findings and built upon these to isolate high and low 
statements that coincided with the variables of interest. I then identified potential item 
measures through an extensive review of extant literature and empirically tested them to 
ensure construct validity. Using a factor analysis, I then examined these variables and 




and  reliability of construct makeup. This factor analysis also enabled the researcher to 
identify high and low levels of each variable to be used in the vignette manipulations. 
Qualitative Sample Descriptive Statistics  
I gathered demographic information, including professional experience and industry 
affiliation, for each interviewee to insure they were an appropriate subject and to avoid 
confounding results (Pannucci & Wilkins, 2010). An additional purpose for gathering 
demographic information was to add validity of the interviewee responses. This was 
imperative since further data and findings in this study will be a product of these initial 
interviews. Existing research suggests that to be valid, qualitative data must be viewed as 
“trustworthy and useful” (Yardley, 2008). To ensure credibility of the interview data, I 
gathered information on the interviewee’s expertise as well as an extensive analysis of 
responses to check for abnormalities and outliers (Mishler, 1990, p. 419).  
Of the male (80%) and female (20%) banking experts interviewed, 90% were white and 
10% were Latino or Hispanic. Their mean age was 42 years old; and they held the corporate 
titles of vice president (30%), senior credit officer (10%), senior vice president (20%), 
executive vice president (10%), market president (10%), managing director (10%), and chief 
credit officer (10%). As shown in Figure 6 below, in reviewing a 2017 study performed by 
the global consulting firm McKinsey & Company on employment levels by gender and 
ethnicity in the banking industry, this study’s sample descriptive statistics seem as an 
appropriate representation (Chin, Nadeau & Krivkovich, 2018). The McKinsey study 
surveyed over 14,000 bankers from 39 financial institutions and offered insights on 






Figure 6. 2017 Employment Levels in Banking by Gender and Ethnicity 
 
Of the male (60%) and female (40%) business owners interviewed, 90% were white and 
10% were Latino or Hispanic. Their mean age was 51 years old; and they held the titles of 
CEO (10%), CEO and founder (60%), and managing member or co-founder (30%). Table 9 
provides a detailed overview of these statistics. 
Qualitative Findings 
Coding Scheme Development 
Once the interviews were a completed and transcribed, I flagged a total of 466 
interviewee statements and cleaned for missing data or duplicates, which paired them down 
to 309 statements. Using these results, I developed a coding scheme to be used to identify 
and match statements to hypothesized categories using definitions from existing literature. 




Verification Costs (VC). To ensure content validity and reliability of these findings, three 
doctoral students were recruited to perform the same task producing a sufficient IRR (r (4) = 
0.87). Only the statements with 100% agreement were selected to move forward. Table 10 
provides the definitions used in these tasks. 
Table 9. Interview Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Bank Experts Business Owners 
  Mean (SD)   Mean (SD) 
Age  42  (5.76) Age 51  (13.80) 
Categories   n   (% ) Categories n   (% ) 
Gender   Gender   
  Male  8   (80)   Male  6  (60) 
  Female 2   (20)   Female 4  (40) 
Race   Race   
  White  9  (90)   White  9  (90) 
  Hispanic or Latino 1  (10)   Hispanic or Latino 1  (10) 
Professional Title   Professional Title  
 Vice President  3  (30)   CEO  1  (10) 
 Senior Credit Officer 1  (10)   CEO, Founder 6  (60) 
  Senior Vice President 2  (20)   Managing Member, Co-Founder 3  (30) 
  Executive Vice President 1  (10)     
  Market President 1  (10) Industry   
  Managing Director 1  (10)   Fine Granite and Stone  1  (10) 
 Chief Credit Officer 1  (10)   Oil and Gas  2  (20) 
      Residential Construction 3  (30) 
Industry     Insurance Services 1  (10) 
 Commercial & Industrial 4  (40)   Music Production 1  (10) 
 Commercial Real Estate 2  (20)   Industrial Equipment  1  (10) 
 Commercial Relationship Banking 3  (30)   Restaurant Franchising 1  (10) 
 Technology   1  (10)     
    Experience (years)   
Experience (years)    5-9  3  (30) 
 10 - 14   2  (20)   10-14  1  (10) 
 15 - 19  6  (60)   15-19  2  (20) 
 20 -24  1  (10)   20-24  1  (10) 
 25+  1  (10)   25-29  2  (20) 











Occurs when “different people know different things” (Stiglitz, 2002). 
Signal receivers focus on signals with costly characteristics (honesty, 
credibility, and commitment). Signals with these attributes initially 
capture the signal receiver’s attention due to their ability to alleviate the 
imbalanced amount of information asymmetry between the signaler and 
the receiver (Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Distortion: Occurs within a signal’s environment and negatively affects the 
observability (clarity, significance) of the signal (Kao & Wu, 1994; 
Warner et al., 2006). Distortion will include behaviors or actions made 
by the signaler or external referents. In the absence of distortion, a 
signal receiver has a clear understanding of the signal’s quality and is 
able to make a confident decision. 
Information 
Verification Costs: 
Associated with acquiring knowledge pertaining to verifying the 
accuracy of a signal (Choudhury & Sampler, 1997; Yang et al., 2002). 
Verification costs include monetary or time/effort costs . 
 
To extend the coding scheme, I identified statements within hypothesized groups of each 
category by conducting a pilot test to isolate the target score. I provided the five doctoral 
students with definitions from existing literature and asked them to analyze and match the 93 
interviewee statements (53 information asymmetry, 26 distortion, and 14 verification costs 
statements). These variable groups included: Signal Honesty (SH), Signal Credibility (SCR), 
Signal Commitment (SCM), Distortion-Signaler Behavior (DSB), Distortion-External 
Factors (DEF), and Verification Costs (VC). I initiated a survey through Qualtrics asking 
respondents to assess each statement using existing definitions of each group based on a 





Table 11. Hypothesized Variable Definitions 
Category Definition 
Signal Honesty Signalers communicate information about themselves that is perceived 
as genuine and possessing underlying quality. Honest signalers are 
confident about their signals and intentionally and forcefully highlight 
information that supports their signals’ quality (Weiler & Weinstein, 
1972; Spence, 1973; Bergara et al., 1998; Connelly et al., 2011). 
Signal Credibility Pertains to signalers’ reputations through their experiences or the 
believability of statements made by reputable third parties (Weiler & 
Weinstein, 1972; Spence, 1973; Bergara et al., 1998; Connelly et al., 
2011). 
Signal Commitment Pertains to signaler’s intent or underlying motivations behind sending 
signals. This can be expressed through their statements or actions, which 
are controlled by signalers. Commitment can mean to sacrifice or endure 
hardships to meet a prespecified goal (Spence, 1973; Bergara et al., 
1998; Connelly et al., 2011). 
Distortion ‒ Signaler 
Behavior 
Includes actions of signalers that create noise or disruption, thus making 
it difficult for receivers to ascertain the true quality of signals (Connelly 
et al., 2011; Gomulya & Mishina, 2017). 
Distortion ‒ External 
Factors 
Includes external factors such as economic or market conditions and 
behavior or information from other signalers in the environment 
(Connelly et al., 2011; Gomulya & Mishina, 2017). 
Information Verification 
Costs 
Refers to the financial costs receivers incur to verify signals’ quality 
(Choudhury & Sampler, 1997: Yang et al., 2002) and the time/effort 
receivers invest/endure to verify signals’ quality (Choudhury & 
Sampler, 1997: Yang et al., 2002). 
 
For each group, three to five statements with the highest and lowest means were calculated 
and isolated. The resulting IRR for all variable responses was (r (5) = 0.67). The coding 
scheme was then finalized by utilizing the following high and low statements (Table 12). 
Table 12. High and Low Statements 
Variable Code Statement Mean 
Signal 
Honesty High 
SHH The founder has borrowed money in the past, which was paid as agreed. 6.40 
SHH The founder has sweat equity in the new venture. 6.00 
SHH The founder reinvests profits back into the new venture rather than taking 
a salary. 
6.00 





SHL The founder has numerous credit cards with outstanding balances. 2.00 
SHL The founder has taken all profits out of the new venture to pay for living 
expenses. 
3.00 
SHL The founder tells you this new venture is more of a hobby. 3.20 










SCRH The new venture is referred to you from a reputable industry source. 6.20 
SCRH Reputable companies within the industry have secured contracts with the 
new venture. 
6.00 
SCRH The new venture has equity investors who have signed letters of intent to 





SCRL The new venture was not referred to you, but rather walked into the bank 
unannounced. 
1.88 
SCRL Unknown companies in unrelated industries have secured contracts with 
the new venture. 
2.00 






SCMH The founder was able to identify problems early on and create a solution 
quickly. 
5.60 
SCMH The founder has spent years developing the new venture’s product. 5.40 
SCMH The founders tell they have personal equity invested in the venture. 5.40 
SCMH The founders’ non-compete from a former company recently expired, so 





SCML The founders rely on other people to identify problems and solutions 
rather than put forth the effort themselves 
1.80 
SCML The founder recently developed the new venture’s product and doesn’t 
have all the details figured out yet. 
2.00 
SCML The founder refuses to use any personal capital or “skin in the game” to 
fund the new venture 
2.00 





DSBH When requesting the loan, the founders of the new venture tell you they 
are very good friends with the bank president 
5.80 
DSBH The founders explain that they liquidated personal assets to make past-
due liability payments rather than let eh debt go to collection. 
5.40 
DSBH When you ask about experience, the founders state that they have 50 
years of industry experience; but they are both in their 40s. 
5.20 
DSBH Although the new venture is entering during an economic downturn, the 






DSBL The founders tell you that they don’t have any reputable contacts in 
banking. 
1.20 
DSBL You receive the new venture’s request during a time when economic 
analysts are predicting a recession. 
1.20 
DSBL Although the local economy is doing very well, the national economy has 
taken a downturn 
1.40 
DSBL The new venture is entering a cyclical industry that is currently 





DEFH The business plan was solid; however, the economic downturn 
dramatically effected the ability to meet first quarter projections 
6.80 
DEFH You receive the new venture’s request during a time when economic 
analysts are predicting a recession.5.04 
6.60 
DEFH The new venture’s request is during an economic panic where the 
government calls on banks to help small businesses recover. 
5.80 










DEFL The business plan was solid and well planned out 1.20 
DEFL The new venture’s request had a unanimous response by the loan officer 
and credit team. 
1.40 
DEFL It is very clear how the Bank should handle the new venture’s loan 
request 
1.60 
DEFL The founders tell you they don’t necessarily need a bank loan, but would 
like to start a credit history for their business. 
  2.20 
Verification 
Costs High 
VCH The founders tell you they have strong integrity. 6.40 
VCH The new venture supplies you with a list of contracts with unrecognizable 
companies they venture is currently working with. 
5.00 
VCH The founders tell you about all of the industry awards they received. 4.80 
VCH The new venture is not publicly traded. 4.80 
VCH The founders supply you with a list of unrecognizable industry 




VCL The founder of the new venture is your city’s former mayor. 1.40 
VCL The new venture supplies you with a list of contracts, which is comprised 
of companies that bank with you. 
2.20 
VCL The founder is the spouse of one of your best customers  3.20 
VCL The new venture is publicly traded so financial information is easy to 
find. 
3.60 




Survey Instrument Development 
To ensure content validity and clarity of the items, which were identified in a review 
of extant literature, a pilot test was conducted through Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 98) 
utilizing the three to five high and low statements from the target score findings with doctoral 
students. Mturk participants were asked to respond to each of the three to five high and low 
statements representing each variable using items developed from existing literature based on 
a Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). Initial IRR results were excellent 
(r (98) = 0.99). To assess the reliability of the items, the means of each statement were 
evaluated to ensure the items were accurately measuring the high and low statements. Also, a 
corrected item total correlation analysis was initiated to measure the correlations between 
each item and the total score. The primary purpose was to identify whether any items would 
greatly affect the reliability if deleted. As shown in Table 13, the initial results reported that 




items within each of the groups reported similar correlation values and exceeded the 
minimum recommended corrected item-total correlation values of 0.3 (Cristobal, Flavian, & 
Guinaliu, 2007) showing high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) of 0.88 – 0.98. Lastly, 
the two highest and lowest statements as well as the two items with the highest item-total 
correlation for each variable were flagged to be used in an additional pilot test for reliability 
(Table 13). 
Table 13. High and Low Items and Statements 
Items Group Statement Mean 
Signal Honesty 
Moussa & Touzani (2008) 
Perceived Credibility of Quality 
Label (PCQL) Scale 
1. I can trust what this 
information says. (0.54,α = 0.91)  
2. This information is honest. 
(0.52,α = 0.91) 
3. This information inspires me 
with confidence. (0.53, α = 0.91) 
SHH The founder has borrowed money in the past, 
which was paid as agreed. 
5.40 
SHH The founder has sweat equity in the new venture. 5.20 
SHH The founder reinvests profits back into the new 
venture rather than taking a salary. 
5.37 
SHH The new venture has a list of investors who 
have already contributed equity. 
5.44 
SHL The founder has numerous credit cards with 
outstanding balances. 
4.98 
SHL The founder has taken all profits out of the new 
venture to pay for living expenses. 
4.78 
SHL The founder tells you this new venture is more 
of a hobby. 
4.71 
SHL The new venture has not received any start-up 
equity from outside investors. 
4.88 
Signal Credibility 
Moussa & Touzani (2008) 
Perceived Credibility of Quality 
Label (PCQL) Scale 
1. This information comes from 
a recognized organization or 
experts. (0.53, α = 0.89)   
2. The organization that gives this 
information has good 
intentions. (0.48,α = 0.89)    
3.  The organization passed 
serious tests before issuing 
this information. (0.58,α = 
0.88) 
SCRH The new venture is referred to you from a 
reputable industry source. 
5.37 
SCRH Reputable companies within the industry have 
secured contracts with the new venture. 
5.38 
SCRH The new venture has equity investors who have 
signed letters of intent to contribute start-up 
capital. 
5.57 
SCRL The new venture was not referred to you, but 
rather walked into the bank unannounced. 
4.55 
SCRL Unknown companies in unrelated industries 
have secured contracts with the new venture. 
4.59 
SCRL The new venture has not received any start-up 
equity from outside investors. 
4.70 
Signal Commitment 
Mowday, Steers, & Porter (1979) 
Organizational Commitment 
1. This information tells me the 
new venture/founder is 
willing to put in a great deal 
of effort beyond what 
normally is expected in order 
SCMH The founder was able to identify problems early 
on and create a solution quickly. 
5.42 
SCMH The founder has spent years developing the new 
venture’s product. 
5.39 
SCMH The founders tell they have personal equity 
invested in the venture. 
5.46 
SCMH The founders’ noncompete from a former company 






Items Group Statement Mean 
to be successful. (0.55, 
α = 0.94)  
2. This information tells me the 
founder is loyal to the new 
venture. (0.51, α = 0.94)  
3. This information tells me the 
new venture/founder is inspired 
to be the very best in the way of 
performance. (0.54, α = 0.94) 
4.  This information tells me the 
new venture/founder really 
cares about the fate of the 
organization. (0.56, α = 0.94) 
SCML The founders rely on other people to identify 
problems and solutions rather than put forth the 
effort themselves 
4.61 
SCML The founder recently developed the new 
venture’s product and doesn’t have all the 
details figured out yet. 
4.57 
SCML The founder refuses to use any personal capital 
or “skin in the game” to fund the new venture 
4.41 
SCML Due to a noncompete, the founder is not able to 
call on any customers. 
4.76 
Distortion - Signaler Behavior 
Jensen & Szulanski (2007) 
Li & Hsieh (2009) 
Knowledge Stickiness 
1. The information sent from the 
founder/new venture would be a 
disruption to our normal 
operations. (0.61, α = 0.96) 
2. This information from the 
founder/new venture would 
make it difficult for us to 
recognize inadequacies. (0.63, 
α = 0.96) 
3. Based on this information 
from the founder/new 
venture, we would not know 
what questions to ask (0.71, α 
= 0.96)   
4.  After receiving this information 
from the founder/new venture, 
we would be less 
knowledgeable than 
before.(0.69, α = 0.96) 
DSBH When requesting the loan, the founders of the 
new venture tell you they are very good friends 
with the bank president 
5.01 
DSBH The founders explain that they liquidated personal 
assets to make past-due liability payments rather 
than let eh debt go to collection. 
4.57 
DSBH When you ask about experience, the founders 
state that they have 50 years of industry 
experience; but they are both in their 40s. 
4.78 
DSBH Although the new venture is entering during an 
economic downturn, the founders have the ability 
to purchase equipment at liquidated prices. 
4.62 
DSBL The founders tell you that they don’t have any 
reputable contacts in banking. 
4.56 
DSBL You receive the new venture’s request during a 
time when economic analysts are predicting a 
recession. 
4.62 
DSBL Although the local economy is doing very well, 
the national economy has taken a downturn 
4.58 
DSBL The new venture is entering a cyclical industry that 
is currently experiencing a downturn, but is 
expected to rebound soon. 
4.74 
Distortion - External Factors     
Nwagu & Ibeku (2016) 
Absorptive Capacity 
Carson et al. (2012) 
 Environmental Ambiguity  
Li & Liu (2014)  
Dynamic Capabilities 
1. Application of this external 
information affects our 
knowledge of the venture. 
(0.58, α  =0.91)  
2. Based on this external 
information, it was difficult to 
know what we needed to make 
a decision about the new 
venture. (0.64, α = 0.96) 
DEFH The business plan was solid; however, the 
economic downturn dramatically effected the 
ability to meet first quarter projections 
5.07 
DEFH You receive the new venture’s request during a 
time when economic analysts are predicting a 
recession. 
5.04 
DEFH The new venture’s request is during an economic 
panic where the government calls on banks to help 
small businesses recover. 
4.99 
DEFH Due to the economic downturn, the new venture is 
in desperate need of funds. 
5.04 
DEFL The business plan was solid and well planned 
out 
4.58 
DEFL The new venture’s request had a unanimous 
response by the loan officer and credit team. 
4.59 
DEFL It is very clear how the Bank should handle the 





Items Group Statement Mean 
3. This external information 
would often cause disagree-
ments about how we should 
proceed with the new venture. 
(0.63, α = 0.96) 
4. Based on this external 
information, we could easily 
make mistakes about moving 
forward with the new venture. 
(0.66, α = 0.96) 
5.  It is difficult to understand 
the impact of the external 
environment on this 
information. (0.54, α = 0.96) 
DEFL The founders tell you they don’t necessarily 
need a bank loan, but would like to start a 
credit history for their business. 
  4.48 
Information Verification Costs   
Lim & Klobas (2000) 
Yang et al. (2002)  
Salojarvi, Furu, & Sveiby, 2005 
Knowledge Acquisition Costs 
1. To verify this information, I 
believe data and knowledge 
collected would be expensive to 
acquire. (0.69, α = 0.98) 
2. To verify this information, I 
would need to spend a lot of 
time sorting relevant from 
irrelevant data and knowledge. 
(0.62, α = 0.98) 
3. To verify this information, I 
would need to spend time 
collecting more than less data 
and knowledge. (0.64, 
α = 0.98) 
4 To verify this information, I 
would need to have a signifi-
cant investment budget in 
seeking external information 
and knowledge, such as 
acquiring consulting services 
from outside experts or 
subscribing to major journals 
and periodical related to your 
industry.  (0.68, α = 0.98) 
5.  To verify this information, there 
would be significant time spent 
by employees in classifying and 
selecting acquired knowledge. 
(0.65, α = 0.98) 
VCH The founders tell you they have strong integrity. 4.83 
VCH The new venture supplies you with a list of 
contracts with unrecognizable companies they 
venture is currently working with. 
5.18 
VCH The founders tell you about all of the industry 
awards they received. 
4.80 
VCH The new venture is not publicly traded. 4.66 
VCH The founders supply you with a list of 
unrecognizable industry professionals they have 
worked with in the past. 
5.07 
VCL The founder of the new venture is your city’s 
former mayor. 
4.26 
VCL The new venture supplies you with a list of 
contracts, which is comprised of companies that 
bank with you. 
4.17 
VCL The founder is the spouse of one of your best 
customers 
4.24 
VCL The new venture is publicly traded so financial 
information is easy to find. 
4.22 
VCL The founders tell you they were referred to you 
by a banker you know very well. 
4.18 






To ensure reliability and create a more distinct instrument, I completed a test-retest via a 
survey through Qualtrics with 25 doctoral students. Respondents performed similar tasks to 
the Amazon Mechanical Turk survey and analyzed the previously identified two high and 
low statements based on a Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) using 
survey all items. Initial IRR results were excellent (r (25) = 0.95). The means and alphas of 
the single high and low statements were calculated. To assess item reliability, a corrected 
item total correlation was calculated to measure the correlations between each item and the 
total score. The items with the highest correlation values corresponded with the two highest 
items previously identified in the Amazon Mechanical Turk survey showing sufficient 
reliability. 
Table 14. Test Retest 
Variable Statement Mean Alpha 
SHH The founder has borrowed money in the past, which was paid as agreed. 5.71 0.95 
SHL The founder tells you this new venture is more of a hobby. 3.56 0.73 
SCRH Reputable companies within the industry have secured contracts with the 
new venture. 
5.64 0.8 
SCRL Unknown companies in unrelated industries have secured contracts with 
the new venture. 
2.88 0.84 
SCMH The founders tell they have personal equity invested in the venture. 6.1 0.9 
SCML The founder refuses to use any personal capital or “skin in the game” to 
fund the new venture 
1.76 0.95 
DSBH When requesting the loan, the founders of the new venture tell you they 
are very good friends with the bank president 
3.75 0.84 
DSBL The founders tell you that they don’t have any reputable contacts in 
banking. 
3.7 0.84 
DEFH You receive the new venture’s request during a time when economic 
analysts are predicting a recession. 
5.2 0.86 
DEFL The founders tell you they don’t necessarily need a bank loan, but would 
like to start a credit history for their business. 
  3.47   0.86 
VCH The founders supply you with a list of unrecognizable industry 
professionals they have worked with in the past. 
5.3 0.9 







Exploratory Factor Analysis  
I performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to provide additional clarity to the 
composition of the predictor variables (Conway & Huffcut, 2003). Prior to conducting the 
EFA, I conducted a pilot test on Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 50). Survey takers were 
asked to respond to each of the identified high (6) and low (6) statements based on all items 
together (12). IRR results were excellent (r (50) = 0.98). 
Initially, I analyzed the data to determine if it was suitable for factor analysis (Field, 
2005). I created a correlation matrix for each variable to examine intercorrelations 
representing potential clusters or factors (Reitwald & Van Hout, 1993; Field, 2005). Each of 
the variables reported suitable item correlations, suggesting that factor analysis was 
appropriate (Appendix C). In addition, I performed a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test on 
each variable, which reported loadings ranging between 0.73 - 0.84, meeting the minimum 
threshold of 0.50 (Williams et al., 2010). I also examined the data using the Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity, which showed significance (p < .001) or that correlations existed and factor 
analysis would be appropriate (Williams et al., 2010). Next, I evaluated the variables to 
identify evidence of multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor (VIF). Based on the 
VIF recommendation for acceptance of less than 10, all variables reported VIF values below 
required levels (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995; Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & 
Wasserman, 1996; Gaur & Gaur, 2006). 
Utilizing the maximum likelihood extraction method, initial Eigen values greater than 
one reported that over 70% of the total variance was explained by two and three factors. I 
performed further analysis by examining the pattern rotations of each variable using an 




2010). The purpose of this was to identify evidence of convergent and divergent validity of 
the hypothesized variables by analyzing loadings with the pattern matrices for signal opacity 
(signal honesty, signal credibility, signal commitment, distortion signaler behavior and 
distortion external factors) and signal verification costs (verification costs). All factor 
loadings less than 0.45 were suppressed, which resulted in nine of the 12 variables showing 
distinct correlational patterns (Field, 2005). Of the two and three-factor patterns, factor 
loadings reported evidence of communalities between distortion-signaler behavior, 
distortion-external factors and verification costs. The internal consistency of these 
communalities reported good values for this factor (α = 0.75). This contradicted the 
originally hypothesized composition of the signal opacity construct. Further analysis also 
revealed that signal honesty, signal credibility and signal commitment showed distinct 
communalities, which again contradicted the initial hypothesized variable compositions. The 
internal consistency of these communalities reported good values for this factor (α = 0.84).  
The overall findings from the communalities within the pattern matrices suggests the 
construct of signal opacity should be comprised of distortion signaler behavior, distortion 
external factors and verification costs. Signal honesty, signal credibility and signal 
commitment should be combined to form the second construct, which for the purpose of this 















HCC Opacity HCC Opacity HCC Opacity HCC Opacity
0.903 0.924 0.910 0.902
0.876 0.884 0.839 0.877
0.780 0.881 0.767 0.628
0.725 0.867 0.751 0.625
0.662 0.855 0.720
0.642 0.787 0.693 0.796
0.916 0.823 0.685 0.761
0.735 0.648 0.645 0.632
0.684 0.627 0.500




















HCC HCC Opacity HCC Opacity HCC Opacity HCC HCC Opacity HCC HCC Opacity
0.981 0.904 0.967 1.000 0.913
0.920 0.590 0.896 0.847 0.683 0.766
0.880 0.689 0.801 0.891
0.745 0.687 0.786 0.833 0.911
0.628 0.663 0.750 0.763 0.767
0.549 0.636 0.702 0.737
0.853 0.747 0.642
0.774 0.699 0.722
0.554 0.736 0.599 0.834
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Figure 8. Modified Theoretical Model 
 
Identification of High and Low Vignette Statements  
Determining the appropriate high and low statement for each manipulated vignette was 
important due to the fact that an interaction between the two variables was hypothesized. By 
examining the mean values from the factor loading results, it was identified that, although a 
statement may be high or low in one factor (ex. signal HCC), it may also contain varying 
high and low levels of the other factor (ex. signal opacity) as well. When developing the four 
manipulated vignettes with varying high and low condition levels (high-high, high-low, low-
high, low-low), the factor analysis findings were leveraged to isolate specific high and low 
statements for each condition. 
The mean value for each statement with the highest item total correlations (in bold) was 
isolated and used to calculate the group mean values for signal HCC (M = 4.64) and signal 
opacity (M = 4.59). For all signal HCC statements, the means for signal opacity were 




statements, the means for signal HCC were calculated and compared with its group mean 
(M = 4.64). The purpose of this was to identify which statements should be utilized in the 
specific manipulated vignette variation (Figures 9 and 10). 
Quantitative Sample  
Participants (N = 306) of the quantitative study included individuals with current or 
former experience in the banking industry. The survey was implemented via Qualtrics and 
responses were then reviewed and analyzed for missing data using SPSS software (Brick & 
Kalton, 1996). While reviewing the data, it was imperative to discern if (1) nonresponse data 
was isolated to a certain question, (2) was not usable due to inexplicable responses, (3) or 
was lost (Battaglia, Sampling, & Lavrakas, 2008). The review of non-responses was also 
analyzed to discern whether the data was missing at random (MAR), missing completely at 
random (MCAR), or not missing at random (NMAR) and determine whether it should be 
removed or replaced (Battaglia et al., 2008). Of the 106 responses with missing values, 85% 
occurred within the first module, and were found to be missing completely at random based 
on the Little’s test (p = 0.690) (Little, 1988). Specifically, these missing values consisted of 
those that did not provide consent (N = 10, 9.4%) and those that consented, but never started 
the survey (N = 39, 36.8%). Within the first module, which measured active and passive 
decision preferences, participants either quit the survey after completing the first question (N 
= 14, 13.2%), after completing half of the module (N = 13, 12.3%), three-quarters of the 
module (N = 8, 7.5%), or the full module (N = 6, 5.7%). Of the few remaining missing 




Figure 9. High and Low Vignette Statements 
Statements 
Item SHH SHL SCRH SCRL SCMH SCML DSBH DSBL DEFH DEFL VCH VCL 
SH 1 5.16  5.24 4.51 5.20  4.46    4.53 5.00 
SH 2  4.27    4.13  4.71 4.37 4.96   
SCR 1    4.45 4.69 4.31   5.08  4.62  
SCR 2 5.10 4.14 4.88    4.33 4.49  4.55  4.61 
SCM 1 4.82  4.88 4.61 5.18 3.90 4.45    4.80  
SCM 2  4.16      4.59 4.51 4.86  4.82 
DSB 1 4.10 4.71 4.22 4.42  4.27      4.57 
DSB 2     4.10  4.96 4.61 4.45 4.55 4.80  
DEF 1 4.18   4.39 4.41 4.22 4.84 4.18 4.78 4.59  4.59 
DEF 2  4.29 4.33        4.71  
VC 1    4.90     4.96  5.14  
VC 2 4.44 4.88 4.96  4.73 4.67 4.71 4.20  4.43  4.71 
Note: Shaded items represent high and low statement means and items with highest item total correlation  
 
Mean 
 SHH SHL SCRH SCRL SCMH SCML DSBH DSBL DEFH DEFL VCH VCL 
Group 
Mean 
HCC       4.41 4.59 4.65 4.79 4.65 4.81 4.64 
Opacity 4.29 4.69 4.62 4.65 4.49 4.46       4.59 

















In retrospect, these surveys were administered during the peak of the Federal Reserve 
Board’s “Paycheck Protection Program.” which was processed solely by local bankers. Since 
the vast majority of missing values were found to exist prior to completing the first module, 
it is logical to assume that respondents simply were forced to pause the survey due to 
extreme job commitments. Once these missing responses were removed, the final data set 
(N = 200) was reviewed and the remaining missing ordinal values were then substituted 
using the mean and categorical variables with “no response” (Battaglia et al., 2008).  
I recorded the demographic information of the final data set of respondents. The 
participants ages ranged from 22 to 80 with a mean age of 45.33 (SD = 13.23). Of the male 
(69%) and female (31%) participants, 84% were white, 6% were black or African American, 
3% were Asian, 1% native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, and 0.5% American Indian or 
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outcome and control variables included in the model. Before generating the interaction, the 
moderator variable (BNK_YRS) was centered (Table 16). 
Table 15. Quantitative Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Banking Experts 
 Mean  (SD) 
Age  45  (13) 
Gender     n  (% ) 
    Male  132  (69.0) 
    Female  58  (31.0) 
Race   
    White  157  (84.0) 
    Black or African American  12  (6.0) 
    Asian  5 (3.0) 
    Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander  2 (1.0) 
    American Indian or Alaska Native  1 (0.5) 
    Other  11 (6.0) 
Marital Status   
    Married  150 (79.0) 
    Divorced  13 (7.0) 
    Separated  1 (0.5) 
    Never Married  23 (12.0) 
    Widowed  3 (1.5) 
Education   
    Junior Secondary School  1 (0.5) 
    Senior High School  8 (4.0) 
    Some University  31 (16.0) 
    Bachelor's Degree  87 (45.0) 
    Master's Degree  61 (32.0) 
    Doctoral Degree  4 (2.0) 
Bank Title   
    Other  53 (26.5) 
    Officer  16 (8.0) 
    Assistant Vice President  16 (8.0) 
    Vice President  45 (22.5) 
    Senior Vice President  40 (20.0) 
    Executive Vice President  16 (8.0) 
    President  10 (5.0) 
    Chief (Credit, Lending, Operating) Officer  3 (1.5) 
    Chief Executive Officer  1 (0.5) 
Income   
    Less than $10,000  4 (2.0) 
    $10,000-49,999  13 (7.0) 
    $50,000-99,999  40 (21.5) 
    $100,000-149,999  42 (22.5) 
    $150,000+  87 (47.0) 
Employment Status   
    Employed Full Time  165 (90.0) 
    Unemployed Looking for Work   6 (3.0) 
    Student  2 (1.0) 





Table 16. Correlation Table 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 M SD 
HCC_H 1                         4.7925 1.21059 
HCC_L .237** 1                       2.9400 1.27654 
Opacity_H .652** .728** 1                     3.8175 1.35169 
Opacity_L .629** .577** .363** 1                   3.9150 1.00640 
LEGIT_HH .826** .306** .777** .338** 1                 3.8000 1.70100 
LEGIT_HL .727** .039 .183** .679** .215** 1               5.7900 1.39600 
LEGIT_LH .203** .828** .790** .233** .229** .074 1             3.8400 1.74700 
LEGIT_LL .170* .749** .322** .721** .257** -.020 .248** 1           2.0500 1.47800 
BNK_YRS -.128 -.128 -.104 -.177* -.140* -.052 -.025 -.192** 1         17.8900 11.84500 
PA -.039 .013 -.060 .016 -.004 -.064 -.089 .082 -.070 1       3.8390 0.52790 
UA .023 .056 .051 .030 -.051 .102 .129 -.056 -.203** .043 1     4.3657 1.00217 
NA .047 .025 .038 .038 .014 .065 .045 -.010 -.146* -.234** .225** 1   1.4600 0.42900 
AGE -.116 -.146 -.112 -.172* -.182* .022 .005 -.253** .705** -.126 -.207** -.189* 1 45.3100 13.17900 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 





The initial portion of this experiment focused on answering the first research question – 
how are new ventures able to secure the perception of legitimacy when they don’t always 
possess optimal signals comparable to a mature firm? To answer this, the sample of bankers 
(N = 200) responded to a survey to test their preference for active or passive decision-
making. Of the sample, the findings reported that 96% of bankers preferred to actively and 
deliberately make decisions. This was an important finding due to the fact that if results 
reported that bankers chose to move forward with a scenario of high signal opacity 
(distortion and verification costs), then their innate preference for active processing was 
successfully manipulated. To test for this, the following hypotheses were examined within 
the experiment. 
Hypothesis 1 
H1: There is a significant difference between a stakeholder’s perception of 
legitimacy due to the levels of signal HCC. 
I conducted a paired samples t-test to compare stakeholders’ perceptions of legitimacy in 
conditions of high and low signal HCC. Prior to conducting the test, I evaluated the 
assumption of normally distributed difference scores. The assumption was satisfied since the 
skew and kurtosis levels were estimated at -0.076 and 0.134, which is less than the maximum 
allowable values for t-tests (skew < |2.0|, kurtosis < |9.0|; Posten, 1984). I estimated the 
bivariate correlation between the two conditions at r = 0.237, p < .001. The main effect of 
signal HCC was statistically significant, t (199) = 17.05, p < .001. These results suggest the 
likelihood that stakeholder legitimacy perceptions were greater in the high HCC condition 








H2: There is a significant difference between a stakeholder’s perception of 
legitimacy due to the levels of signal opacity. 
I conducted a paired samples t-test to compare stakeholders’ perceptions of 
legitimacy in conditions of high and low signal opacity. Prior to conducting the test, I 
evaluated the assumption of normally distributed difference scores. The assumption was 
satisfied since the skew and kurtosis levels were estimated at -0.459 and 1.59, which is less 
than the maximum allowable values for t-tests (skew < |2.0|, kurtosis < |9.0|; Posten, 1984). I 
estimated the bivariate correlation between the two conditions at r = 0.363, p < .001. The 
main effect of signal opacity was not significant, t (199) = -1.01, p = 0.312, failing to reject 
the null hypothesis and suggesting there is not a difference in stakeholder perceptions of 
legitimacy based on signal opacity. Cohen’s d for the signal opacity condition resulted in a 






H3: There is a significant difference between a stakeholder’s perception of 
legitimacy due to the interaction between signal opacity and signal 
verification costs.  
I performed a one-way repeated measures ANOVA to evaluate the interaction of signal 
opacity on the main effect of signal HCC on stakeholder legitimacy perceptions (Hypothesis 
3a). I also evaluated the interaction of signal HCC on the main effect of signal opacity on 
stakeholder legitimacy perceptions (Hypothesis 3b). In visually reviewing the descriptive 
statistics, mean values of “Legitimacy High-High” (M = 3.80, SD = 1.70) and “Legitimacy 
Low-High” (M = 3.83, SD = 1.75) initially appear similar, while “Legitimacy High-Low” 
(M = 5.78, SD = 1.40) and “Legitimacy Low-Low” (M = 2.05, SD = 1.48) seem different. 
To provide further analysis to support these initial results, I discuss the following results.  
To ensure validity of the repeated measures ANOVA and reduce the chance of a Type 1 
error, literature notes that the results must comply with three assumptions (Huynh & Feldt, 




observations, through the use of random selection of the participants (Keppel & Zedeck, 
1989). I evaluated the second assumption, multivariate normality, using the Pillai’s Trace 
test. Although each of the four tests [Wilk’s Lambda = 0.229, F (3, 197) = 220.66, p < .001; 
Hotelling’s Trace = 3.360, F (3, 197) = 220.66, p < .001; Roy’s Largest Root = 3.360, F (3, 
197) = 220.66, p < .001] reported significance, the Pillai’s Trace has been found to represent 
a more robust test for violations of assumptions (Olson, 1974). The results of Pillai’s Trace 
was 0.771, F (3, 197) = 220.66, p < .001 and supports that the null hypothesis should be 
rejected, stating that there is no significant difference between the means.  
The third assumption is that there is a homogeneity of variance of differences or a 
sphericity across treatments (Kogos, 2000). Violating sphericity can increase the Type 1 error 
rate (Stevens, 2012). This assumption was not violated, χ 2 (2) = 5.469, p = 0.361, showing 
that the variances of the mean differences are equal (Stevens, 2012). Since sphericity is 
assumed, the results of the test of within-subjects effects, F (3, 597) = 224.09, p < .001, show 
that there is a statistically significant difference between the means of the within-subjects 
variable “legitimacy.” 
I then conducted four pairwise comparisons to isolate where the mean differences 
occurred. Utilizing the Bonferroni post hoc test to keep the Type 1 error at 5% overall, a 
significant difference (p < .001) was identified between the means of all legitimacy 







H4a: The difference between a stakeholder’s perception of legitimacy due to 
the levels of signal HCC is significantly enhanced when stakeholder 
expertise is high and reduced when it is low. 
H4b: The difference between a stakeholder’s perception of legitimacy due to 
the levels of signal opacity is significantly enhanced when stakeholder 
expertise is high and reduced when it is low. 
To answer the second research question of how stakeholders are able process new 
venture signals when quality is difficult to assess due to similar costs, I evaluated the 
moderating role of stakeholder expertise. I initiated a linear mixed effects model with 
repeated measures with a normalized dummy-coded variation of legitimacy (0100 = high-
high, 0010 = high-low, 0001 = low-high, 0000 = low-low) as the repeated effects outcome 
variable. Included in the data set was the between-subjects, fixed effects of 46 levels of bank 




interaction of bank years and dummy coded legitimacy. Although the fixed main effect of the 
dummy-coded legitimacy was significant F (3, 462) = 124.02, p <.001, the fixed main effect 
of bank years F (45, 154) = 1.25 and the fixed interaction effect of bank years and dummy-
coded legitimacy F (135, 462) = 0.914 was not significant, p = 0.161, p = 0.733. These 
findings suggest that stakeholder experience does not have a significant moderating effect on 
the main effect of signal HCC and signal opacity on the stakeholder legitimacy perceptions. 
This analysis was repeated and controlled for positive and negative affect, uncertainty 
avoidance, age, race and gender. The fixed effect of the dummy-coded legitimacy, controlled 
for positive affect F (23, 6) = 0.969, p = 0.570, negative affect F (19, 6) = 0.863, p = 0.632, 
uncertainty avoidance F (30, 6) = 1.022, p = 0.543, age F (45, 6) = 0.890, p = 0.636, race F 
(5, 6) = 1.038, p = 0.473 and gender F (1, 6) = 2.293, p = 0.181 was found to not have a 



































DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Overview 
 In this chapter, I provide a summation and further interpretation of my findings to 
understand the unique and strategic role new venture signals play when requesting external 
capital to fund growth. This discussion will include (1) an examination of how new ventures 
are able to secure a stakeholder perception of legitimacy, and (2) how stakeholders are able 
to decipher new ventures’ quality when their cost exists within a pooling equilibrium. To 
address these questions, I conducted an extensive literature review, detailing extant literature 
surrounding signaling and institutional theory. I then isolated variables of interest, developed 
and operationalized to be empirically tested by leveraging a sample of banking experts. In the 
following, I discuss these results along with their implications for theory and practice, 
concluding with the limitations of this study and future directions for research. 
Results 
 As two sides exists for every coin, the funding of a new venture debt contract is only 
successfully completed when both parties converge towards a negotiated agreement. On one 
side of the debt contract, the new venture complies with the requirement to provide collateral 




The new venture also agrees to adhere to scheduled monitoring requirements due to the 
stakeholder’s passive or “hands off” approach to the relationship (Berger & Udell, 1998; 
Berger et al., 1999). Alternatively, the stakeholder makes an informed decision to provide the 
new venture with funded capital by mitigating the risk of default through an evaluation of 
creditworthiness (Berger & Udell, 1998).  
However, before this agreement can be executed, the two parties must have an initial 
meeting concluding with the stakeholder’s decision to move forward with the loan process. 
This delicate stage, although seemingly insignificant on the surface, holds extreme 
importance for the ultimate goal of external capital funding for the new venture. When the 
perception of legitimacy is attained, the stakeholder ultimately becomes the advocate of the 
new venture. Behind the curtain of the lending process exists a multitude of decision makers 
who comprise the bank’s loan committee. Although during the loan presentation, the 
committee has access to objective information about the new venture, many times they are 
very interested in the inaccessible subjective details as well (Chen, Huang, Tsai, & Tzeng, 
2015). The committee looks to advocates to provide this information as well as their opinion 
of legitimacy, which interestingly was determined during that initial meeting. For this reason, 
my research questions hold high importance within the strategy of entrepreneurship. 
Research Question 1 
The first research question aimed to understand how new ventures were able to secure the 
perception of stakeholder legitimacy when they’re unable to provide costly signals similar to 
those of mature firms. Utilizing the results from the main effect and interaction tests of signal 
HCC and signal opacity, I found that in environments of high signal opacity, new ventures 




stakeholder legitimacy as those possessing high HCC signals. This supports the notion that 
bankers may be less focused on signals with costly characteristics when their attention has 
been distracted due to opacity. This also implies that the “playing field” for new ventures 
becomes figuratively even when signal opacity is high.  
In relation to stakeholders bypassing their innate preferences for active decision making, 
the findings show that high signal opacity instigates passivity. For example, when faced with 
a scenario of high and low signal opacity, stakeholders are more apt to move forward with a 
new venture that signals low HCC when signal opacity was high. This supports the notion 
that when faced with high distortion and verification costs, stakeholders may choose to move 
forward passively rather than fully verifying the low HCC signals.  
Research Question 2  
 My second research question aimed to understand how stakeholders were able to 
ascertain a new venture’s quality when cost was difficult to assess. I proposed that 
stakeholders were able to use their years of expertise to leverage similar new venture 
schemas in making legitimacy perceptions. Unfortunately, the moderating relationship did 
not report a significant effect and could not be used to answer this second research question. 
Despite this, these findings do not explicitly conclude that stakeholder expertise is 
unimportant in legitimacy decisions, but rather only specifically within this study’s narrow 
scope of signal HCC and signal opacity. In reviewing the mean values of stakeholder 
legitimacy perceptions, the findings do show that a stakeholder effectively passes on a new 
venture request due to poor signal HCC when signal opacity is low and will occasionally 




that when new ventures send signals of similar costs (low signal HCC), stakeholders can 
effectively ascertain quality and make legitimacy decisions when signal opacity is low. 
The Strategy and Morality of Signal Opacity 
Signal opacity can be viewed both as a strategic tactic for new ventures to leverage and 
capitalize upon as well as a hindrance to stakeholders, as evidenced by the net losses due to 
charged-off debt contracts. As shown through recent economic crises within the United 
States due to poor lending decisions, signal opacity exemplifies a conversation that 
cautiously walks a “tight rope of morality.” An important component of this study’s primary 
purpose lies within its moral compass that signal opacity should be used not to deceive 
stakeholders, but to strategically manipulate them to acknowledge signalers’ quality (Cronk, 
1994). For instance, since many new ventures are unable to provide costly signals similar to 
mature firms, leveraging opacity such as mentioning “a friendship with the bank’s president,” 
aims to enhance stakeholders’ perceptions of quality when cost is difficult to assess. Signal 
opacity allows new ventures to have opportunities for legitimacy similar to those with 
superior signals. 
However, opacity is not always controlled and manipulated by the signaler, but rather by 
external forces such as economic conditions or disasters (Yao et al., 2019). For example, as a 
result of the recent Coronavirus pandemic, the Federal Reserve asked financial institutions to 
provide working capital loans to small businesses via the CARES Act (Humphries, Neilson, 
& Ulyssea, 2020). Assuming that small businesses are able to provide the required 
verification within the specified time window that funds were used as intended, the Federal 
Reserve will ultimately forgive the outstanding loan balance (Boccia et al., 2020). From a 




but also the desperation of business owners (signaler’s behavior), significantly hindered their 
ability to objectively ascertain the true creditworthiness of the borrower. Also, since there 
was a limited allotment of funds to be dispersed, lenders were forced to underwrite loan 
request quickly, which presumably impacted the time and effort allotted towards verification 
costs. This example provides a current illustration of how signal opacity exists within a non-
strategic environment as well. 
Research Implications 
This study offers implications for researchers of strategic management, specifically 
within the field of entrepreneurship. Literature has examined the state of strategic 
management, specifically chronicling its metamorphosis from a field primarily composed of 
case studies to a robust and theoretically driven domain (Hitt, Ireland, Camp, & Sexton, 
2004). Within entrepreneurship, strategic theories have been developed utilizing extant 
literature from economics, psychology, sociology and organizational behavior (Ireland, 
Camp, & Sexton, 2014). As a result of this evolution, literature has expanded upon signaling 
and institutional theory to uncover new venture legitimacy strategies (Suchman, 1995; 
Bitektine, 2011; Connelly et al., 2011). For instance, the examination of legitimacy-as 
perception provided a detailed level of understanding as to the multiple levels and variations 
of stakeholder legitimacy (Suddaby et al., 2017).  
Existing literature has examined strategic signaling utilizing a top-down or “stimulus-
creating” approach that leverages signal observability to capture a receivers initial attention 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Ocasio, 2011). Literature has also expanded upon a 
stakeholder’s use of the bottom-up or “stimulus-driven” perspective in passively searching 




contributes to theory and practice within strategic entrepreneurship by combining these 
theoretical perspectives to explore new venture signals that strategically leverage opacity to 
instigate passive decision-making by stakeholders. The findings suggests that signal opacity 
promotes a bottom-up perspective by inhibiting a stakeholder’s ability to actively process and 
differentiate between superior and poor signals. 
 This study also contributes to psychology literature concerning the use of heuristics to 
passively make legitimacy decisions when information is scarce (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974; Gigerenzer, 1996). Literature has noted that passivity is related to the accessing of 
validity cues when the entirety of information is unavailable and time is critical (Suchman, 
1995; Tost, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015). This study’s findings suggests that signal 
opacity disrupts a stakeholder’s use of validity cues to passively decipher superior from poor 
signals when signal opacity is high. This is due to the shift in a stakeholder’s focus caused by 
the signal’s distortion and verification costs. 
This study contributes to the signaling and legitimacy conversation within strategic 
entrepreneurship research by focusing on the banker as a representation of the stakeholder. 
Extant literature has focused on the new venture’s quest for external capital through the lens 
of the venture capitalist, angel investor and crowdfunding stakeholder (Kaiser et al., 2007; 
Mitra, 2012; Huang, 2018). By contributing to existing research that has utilized the banking 
and debt contract context (Berger & Udell, 1998; Berger et al., 1999), this study extends the 
conversation regarding strategic entrepreneurship. This provides an alternative perspective 
where the stakeholder is not considered an equity partner that is actively engaged in daily 
decisions, but rather a passive party that monitors growth via information controlled and 




New Ventures and Bankers 
This study offers practical implications for entrepreneurs and industry professionals 
within the lending space by bridging the gap between research and practice (Briner et al., 
2012). The impact of the growth of small businesses to this nation’s economy has been a 
topic of interest for many years (Brock, Evans, Phillips, 1986; Robu, 2013). According to the 
United States Small Business Administration, two-thirds of net new jobs and 44% of 
economic activity is attributed to the success small businesses (SBA Office of Advocacy, 
2019). By furthering the conversation of new venture strategy within the perspective of 
banking industry professionals, this study adds an additional layer of legitimacy to its theory. 
This perspective also affirms the importance of scholarly research pertaining to the topic of 
new venture growth through external capital.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Several limitations and opportunities for future research exists within this research study, 
particularly within the examination of the moderating effect of stakeholder expertise and the 
development of the survey instrument. 
A limitation of this study was the decision to utilize “years of bank experience” as the 
single measure to represent stakeholder expertise. This may have limited this study’s ability 
to robustly examine the moderating role of stakeholder expertise. Within the hypotheses 
development of this study, the topic of receiver schemas was discussed as a component of 
stakeholder expertise. Receiver schemas have been described in literature as set of cognitions 
based on similarities between the signal and/or sender and previous firms the receiver has 
evaluated. (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Heil & Robertson, 1991; Gulati & Higgins, 




level of information asymmetry or ambiguity. (Reger, Gustafson, Demarie, & Mullane, 1994; 
Plummer et al., 2016). Receivers with extensive domain-specific schemas that are 
interpreting signal opacity may possess a greater portfolio of similar experiences to access. 
This can potentially strengthen or weaken the effectiveness of signal opacity based on the 
depth of receiver schemas.  
Future research should incorporate receiver schemas within the examination of 
stakeholder expertise. For instance, research should examine how a signal receiver’s past 
experiences can produce positive or negative reactions to signal opacity, which the signal 
sender has no way of predicting. An interesting theory proposed by Drover et al. (2018) 
described how the valence of one signal may be interpreted differently than if it was sent 
within a set of multiple signals with a range of positive and negative effects. Ultimately, the 
negative reaction of one signal may be alleviated if coupled within a group of positive signals 
and vice versa. The valence of these signal groups was theorized as uniform, imbalanced and 
balanced congruence with the positive and negative symbols depicting signal receiver 
reactions (Drover et al., 2018). An example of this as an extension of the examination of 
signal opacity is included in the table below. 
Table 16. Signal Set Valence 







Signal HCC/Opacity Set 1 
Signal HCC/Opacity Set 2 
Signal HCC/Opacity Set 3 
Signal HCC/Opacity Set 4 
+   +   +   + 
‒   ‒   ‒   ‒ 
+   ‒   ‒   ‒ 
‒   +   +   + 
+   +   ‒   ‒ 
‒   ‒   +   + 
 
Another limitation of this study was the inability to recruit bank experts during the survey 




instrument, doctoral students and respondents from Amazon Mechanical Turk were recruited 
to collect data. An additional layer of robustness would have been added to the instrument if 
bank experts would have been accessible for collection at this stage of development. 
Unfortunately, due to the Coronavirus pandemic, the sample of bank experts were 
intentionally earmarked specifically for the main study to ensure reliable results. As 
discussed within the findings of this study, a test-retest was performed during development to 
ensure reliability of the survey instrument despite the inability to recruit bank experts. Future 
research should utilize bank experts to replicate the instrument development process.  
In conclusion, this study demonstrated the influence of opacity on signaling and 
legitimacy perceptions. By potentially shedding light on how new ventures are able to secure 
external capital and why stakeholders grant them legitimacy, this study hopes to provide 
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APPENDIX A: Interview Questions  
 
Business Owners 
1. Please describe your business in detail. 
2. What is your level of experience as an entrepreneur? 
3. What do you feel are the most important characteristics in a new venture? 
4. What do you feel are the most important characteristics in an entrepreneur? 
5. What do you feel are the least important characteristics in a new venture? 
6. What do you feel are the least important characteristics in an entrepreneur? 
7. Tell me about a time that you provided information about you or your company 
that you knew would be difficult for them to fully verify. 
8. Tell me about a time that you gave information about you or your company and 
you were confident of how they would perceive it. 
9. Tell me about a time when someone asked a lot of probing questions about you or 
your company after receiving a piece of information from you. 
10.  What do you feel are the most important characteristics a banker looks for in a 
new venture? 
11.  What do you feel are the most important characteristics a banker looks for in an 
entrepreneur? 
12.  What do you feel are the least important characteristics a banker looks for in a 
new venture? 
13.  What do you feel are the least important characteristics a banker looks for in an 
entrepreneur? 
14.  Tell me about why you chose to request a bank loan. 
15.  Tell me about the positives and negatives you remember from the loan process. 
16.  Tell me about a time that you provided the banker with information about you or 
your company that you knew would be difficult for them to fully verify. 
17.  Tell me about a time that you gave a banker information about you or your 
company and you were confident of how they would perceive it. 
18.  Tell me about a time when the banker asked a lot of probing questions about you 





1. What is your level of experience in lending to new ventures? 
2. What are the main challenges in assessing credit risk of a new venture? 
3. What do you feel are the most important characteristics of a new venture? 
4. What do you feel are the most important characteristics of an entrepreneur? 
5. What do you feel are the least important characteristics of a new venture? 
6. What do you feel are the least important characteristics of an entrepreneur? 
7. Tell me about a time when you took someone’s word instead of fully verifying what 
they said. 
8. What do you feel are the most important characteristics of an entrepreneur when 
evaluating credit risk? 
9. What do you feel are the most important characteristics of a new venture when 
evaluating credit risk? 
10.  What do you feel are the least important characteristics of an entrepreneur when 
evaluating credit risk? 
11.  What do you feel are the least important characteristics of a new venture when 
evaluating credit risk? 
12.  Tell me about borrowers in your loan portfolio that have been the most profitable for 
the bank. 















APPENDIX C: Factor Analyses 
 
 
















Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 









SH_1 3.723 3.833 3.785 3.829 2.604 3.817 3.848 3.765 3.75 3.826 3.839
SH_2 2.202 1.989 2.183 2.286 2.288 2.29 2.16 2.268 2.224 2.225 2.214
SCR_1 2.795 2.452 2.815 2.72 2.806 2.394 2.495 2.789 2.751 2.822 2.824
SCR_2 3.167 3.09 3.231 2.507 3.112 3.144 3.162 3.235 2.932 3.233 3.161
SCM_1 2.713 2.738 2.642 2.122 2.638 2.743 2.687 2.727 2.741 2.684 2.608
SCM_2 2.946 4.379 4.355 4.208 4.213 4.313 4.308 4.365 4.365 4.356 4.167
DSB_1 3.936 3.993 3.386 3.875 3.994 3.93 3.818 3.68 3.548 3.947 3.618
DSB_2 2.788 2.646 2.479 2.738 2.749 2.758 2.683 2.515 2.693 2.759 2.696
DEF_1 3.234 3.294 3.285 3.321 3.306 3.313 3.065 2.982 3.074 3.165 3.283
DEF_2 2.263 2.27 2.277 2.114 2.335 2.327 2.076 2.243 2.16 2.336 2.271
VC_1 1.898 1.867 1.92 1.917 1.88 1.91 1.899 1.889 1.828 1.921 1.457
VC_2 2.263 2.207 2.283 2.227 2.17 2.171 2.068 2.193 2.253 2.219 1.732




Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 
Signal Credibility – High 
 
 
SH_1 3.723 1.921 1.941 1.913 1.985 1.757 1.993 1.717 1.983 1.907 1.927
SH_2 2.914 3.158 3.535 3.525 3.376 3.476 3.486 2.85 3.427 3.469 3.569
SCR_1 3.604 3.294 2.923 3.685 3.717 3.399 3.722 3.544 3.548 3.602 3.742
SCR_2 3.367 3.409 2.703 3.32 3.396 3.46 3.432 3.336 3.435 3.455 3.399
SCM_1 2.12 2.171 2.176 2.12 1.915 2.129 2.192 2.208 2.21 2.197 2.181
SCM_2 3.12 2.951 3.115 3.078 2.718 2.824 3.081 3.13 3.105 3.132 3.132
DSB_1 2.709 2.98 2.794 3.076 2.963 2.77 2.62 2.994 3.016 3.022 2.97
DSB_2 2.383 2.316 2.372 2.365 2.365 2.342 2.031 1.867 2.372 2.308 2.368
DEF_1 1.987 1.833 2.186 2.225 2.306 2.303 2.246 1.807 2.261 2.081 2.308
DEF_2 1.877 1.803 1.79 1.874 1.887 1.869 1.851 1.878 1.849 1.888 1.743
VC_1 1.59 1.608 1.601 1.661 1.653 1.661 1.634 1.61 1.5 1.663 1.418
VC_2 2.153 2.216 2.228 2.189 2.199 2.225 2.151 2.213 2.228 2.057 1.9




Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 
 
Signal Credibility – Low 
 
SH_1 2.901 2.818 2.577 2.725 2.666 2.917 2.789 2.752 2.928 2.92 2.863
SH_2 2.343 2.097 2.364 2.36 2.302 2.094 1.964 1.87 2.35 2.362 2.211
SCR_1 2.272 2.093 2.354 2.356 2.146 2.004 2.143 1.985 2.16 2.305 2.354
SCR_2 1.869 2.123 2.118 1.912 2.103 2.052 2.106 2.104 1.954 2.087 2.054
SCM_1 2.018 2.164 2.164 1.951 2.133 2.142 2.167 2.162 2.047 2.127 2.148
SCM_2 1.881 2.012 1.879 2.046 2.033 2.051 2.02 2.056 2.051 2.065 2.049
DSB_1 4.33 3.849 3.69 4.2 4.294 4.314 2.838 4.254 3.675 4.285 4.309
DSB_2 4.34 3.784 4.136 4.517 4.553 4.454 2.975 3.812 4.484 4.538 4.553
DEF_1 2.502 2.105 2.239 2.638 2.655 2.65 2.606 2.228 2.376 2.659 2.621
DEF_2 3.56 3.538 3.259 3.276 3.361 3.534 3.011 3.504 3.177 3.557 3.511
VC_1 2.303 2.307 2.255 2.27 2.266 2.308 2.277 2.301 2.307 2.308 1.293
VC_2 2.556 2.444 2.608 2.528 2.59 2.592 2.592 2.613 2.574 2.578 1.463





Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 
Signal Commitment – High 
SH_1 3.622 3.097 3.742 3.761 3.74 3.717 3.566 3.773 3.759 3.774 3.753
SH_2 4.155 3.601 4.312 3.546 4.221 4.131 4.316 4.323 4.329 4.287 4.327
SCR_1 4.379 4.438 4.709 5.178 5.326 4.731 5.316 5.257 5.343 5.342 5.186
SCR_2 3.497 3.513 3.113 3.413 3.449 3.379 3.435 3.53 3.4 3.267 3.257
SCM_1 4.619 3.797 4.497 4.485 3.814 4.241 4.438 4.57 4.49 4.598 4.525
SCM_2 3.135 3.085 3.158 3.094 2.603 3.162 3.155 3.035 2.603 2.957 2.952
DSB_1 2.827 2.74 2.545 2.75 2.627 2.869 2.856 2.761 2.869 2.87 2.873
DSB_2 2.804 2.959 2.957 2.891 2.842 2.96 2.954 2.184 2.895 2.943 2.821
DEF_1 2.499 2.497 2.463 2.502 2.465 2.398 2.405 1.84 2.348 2.413 2.263
DEF_2 2.256 2.265 2.268 2.183 2.194 1.863 2.264 2.209 2.127 1.7 2.123
VC_1 2.219 2.198 2.222 2.056 2.201 2.074 2.219 2.2 2.142 1.665 1.446
VC_2 1.937 1.947 1.894 1.799 1.902 1.818 1.95 1.852 1.763 1.826 1.27




Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 
Signal Commitment – Low 
SH_1 1.441 1.93 1.965 1.964 1.844 1.784 1.915 1.946 1.902 1.964 1.97
SH_2 1.505 2.055 2.057 2.032 2.054 1.759 2.022 1.857 1.715 2.052 2.006
SCR_1 3.215 3.278 2.138 3.244 3.24 3.031 3.271 3.19 3.265 3.259 2.971
SCR_2 2.818 2.825 1.84 2.79 2.623 2.825 2.822 2.682 2.812 2.798 2.825
SCM_1 1.514 1.5 1.502 1.5 1.231 1.492 1.466 1.364 1.483 1.519 1.518
SCM_2 2.089 2.228 2.203 2.072 1.809 2.196 2.048 1.848 2.18 2.224 2.175
DSB_1 2.586 2.442 2.637 2.857 2.806 2.811 2.57 2.304 2.51 2.823 2.841
DSB_2 2.98 3.013 3.055 3.063 2.958 2.813 2.759 2.834 2.75 2.995 2.924
DEF_1 4.62 4.222 4.547 4.442 4.2 3.874 3.774 4.324 3.822 4.463 4.664
DEF_2 2.801 2.419 2.887 2.889 2.833 2.834 2.55 2.603 2.371 2.902 2.718
VC_1 2.508 2.509 2.498 2.492 2.515 2.506 2.486 2.457 2.4 2.516 1.768
VC_2 2.911 2.839 2.635 2.911 2.909 2.837 2.896 2.776 2.902 2.727 2.046




Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 
Distortion Signaler Behavior – High 
 
 
SH_1 2.623 2.461 2.728 2.677 2.677 2.591 2.678 2.581 2.633 2.687 2.729
SH_2 6.809 6.818 5.834 5.814 6.45 6.774 5.36 7.083 5.212 6.878 7.085
SCR_1 5.7 6.085 6.134 5.999 6.044 6.038 5.812 4.751 5.619 6.306 6.05
SCR_2 3.741 3.082 3.631 3.652 3.727 3.569 3.015 3.455 3.631 3.277 3.671
SCM_1 3.719 3.112 3.598 3.7 3.682 3.732 3.471 3.761 3.746 3.465 3.741
SCM_2 3.474 3.226 3.387 3.528 3.44 3.539 2.588 3.272 3.542 3.533 3.446
DSB_1 1.683 1.695 1.693 1.691 1.745 1.771 1.772 1.699 1.615 1.729 1.764
DSB_2 2.806 2.164 2.629 2.303 2.617 2.089 2.858 2.462 2.775 2.835 2.84
DEF_1 4.358 4.607 3.462 4.253 4.57 4.256 4.415 3.966 3.056 4.26 4.504
DEF_2 3.592 2.739 3.308 3.611 3.677 3.722 3.392 3.613 2.469 3.62 3.549
VC_1 2.179 2.149 2.207 1.938 2.022 2.207 2.159 2.194 2.046 2.152 1.802
VC_2 2.272 2.272 2.174 2.228 2.242 2.21 2.261 2.256 2.221 2.166 1.85





Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 
Distortion Signaler Behavior – Low 
 
SH_1 6.351 6.453 5.927 5.623 6.343 6.166 6.26 6.183 6.487 6.499 6.006
SH_2 4.754 4.74 3.704 4.867 4.44 4.774 4.803 4.797 4.772 4.238 4.873
SCR_1 7.744 7.598 6.358 6.509 7.743 7.693 7.686 7.173 4.424 7.77 7.604
SCR_2 7.649 6.386 6.839 8.401 8.386 8.211 8.393 7.469 8.311 8.316 7.838
SCM_1 4.909 5.676 4.736 5.683 5.536 5.658 4.798 5.672 4.703 5.672 5.681
SCM_2 3.407 3.186 3.467 3.49 3.406 3.228 3.444 2.957 3.468 3.268 3.492
DSB_1 3.214 3.325 3.342 3.316 3.378 3.132 3.267 3.239 3.387 3.026 3.13
DSB_2 2.559 2.623 2.618 2.658 2.247 2.621 2.562 2.587 2.588 2.607 2.37
DEF_1 2.665 2.761 2.576 2.494 2.8 2.372 2.678 2.727 2.605 2.805 2.802
DEF_2 3.112 3.057 1.768 3.089 2.584 3.096 3.117 3.037 2.9 3.064 2.831
VC_1 1.758 1.531 1.751 1.742 1.757 1.645 1.57 1.724 1.76 1.727 1.682
VC_2 3.904 4.231 4.118 3.947 4.229 4.225 3.902 3.768 4.226 3.836 4.043




Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 
Distortion External Factors – High 
 
 
SH_1 2.414 1.691 2.407 2.323 2.119 2.4 2.398 2.049 2.389 2.4 2.367
SH_2 2.925 2.918 2.816 2.564 2.229 2.916 2.788 2.853 2.823 2.899 2.893
SCR_1 1.933 2.753 2.683 2.757 2.716 2.607 2.674 2.606 2.755 2.759 2.746
SCR_2 2.159 2.084 2.105 1.919 2.098 2.116 2.159 2.088 2.12 2.146 2.116
SCM_1 2.965 2.701 3.078 2.731 3.079 2.987 2.949 3.053 3.079 3.049 2.939
SCM_2 3.056 2.652 3.425 3.372 3.479 3.423 3.451 2.447 3.378 3.452 3.433
DSB_1 1.607 1.611 1.526 1.579 1.567 1.589 1.544 1.578 1.608 1.615 1.598
DSB_2 2.846 2.73 2.775 2.855 2.742 2.84 2.737 2.862 2.721 2.7 2.714
DEF_1 2.519 2.894 2.802 2.861 2.941 2.086 2.898 2.965 2.967 2.942 2.956
DEF_2 1.848 1.803 1.864 1.829 1.866 1.812 1.859 1.774 1.868 1.754 1.835
VC_1 2.365 2.358 2.379 2.358 2.355 2.36 2.379 2.242 2.359 2.234 2.158
VC_2 2.624 2.647 2.662 2.615 2.553 2.639 2.646 2.535 2.666 2.63 2.427




Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 
Distortion External Factors – Low 
 
 
SH_1 2.141 1.717 2.119 1.915 2.13 2.147 1.983 2.053 2.081 2.134 2.147
SH_2 2.4 2.39 2.399 2.307 2.411 1.91 1.954 2.301 2.409 2.407 2.365
SCR_1 1.716 2.13 2.109 2.087 2.146 2.144 2.108 2.05 2.148 2.149 2.093
SCR_2 1.631 1.648 1.625 1.564 1.653 1.645 1.646 1.648 1.651 1.654 1.641
SCM_1 2.356 2.532 2.57 2.5 2.516 2.636 2.646 2.313 2.45 2.638 2.596
SCM_2 2.422 2.446 2.443 2.442 2.326 2.368 2.183 2.38 2.395 2.432 2.203
DSB_1 2.265 1.797 2.264 2.255 2.261 2.197 2.142 2.239 2.262 2.195 2.269
DSB_2 2.837 2.493 3.018 3.059 3.077 2.746 2.904 3.064 3.064 3.039 2.408
DEF_1 2.956 2.956 2.955 3.081 2.707 3.013 3.055 3.084 2.632 3.085 2.946
DEF_2 1.936 1.999 2 1.996 1.853 1.959 1.994 1.992 1.701 1.955 1.983
VC_1 1.574 1.584 1.586 1.585 1.582 1.577 1.535 1.567 1.58 1.55 1.581
VC_2 2.16 2.121 2.106 2.143 2.122 1.948 2.163 1.693 2.058 2.143 2.156




Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 
Verification Costs – High 
 
 
SH_1 1.916 1.937 1.909 1.835 1.71 1.65 1.924 1.922 1.934 1.939 1.821
SH_2 2.074 2.094 1.983 2.098 1.763 2.072 2.092 2.091 1.85 2.027 2.099
SCR_1 1.945 1.942 1.916 1.76 1.931 1.946 1.823 1.931 1.945 1.924 1.935
SCR_2 2.259 2.167 2.259 2.247 2.11 2.29 2.262 2.113 2.272 2.27 2.162
SCM_1 2.136 2.256 2.041 2.21 2.248 2.107 2.091 2.19 2.243 2.204 2.254
SCM_2 2.886 2.749 3.247 3.009 3.259 2.807 3.261 3.253 3.25 3.09 2.4
DSB_1 2.133 2.474 2.506 2.502 2.34 2.15 2.144 2.506 2.449 2.382 2.428
DSB_2 2.886 2.899 2.724 2.868 2.694 2.899 2.488 2.852 2.908 2.55 2.687
DEF_1 2.43 2.442 2.432 2.257 2.379 2.437 2.451 2.404 2.449 2.327 1.888
DEF_2 2.028 1.792 2.031 2.013 2.02 2.019 1.985 2.032 2.031 1.893 1.919
VC_1 2.295 2.217 2.269 2.271 2.241 2.167 2.181 2.012 2.179 2.137 2.294
VC_2 3.729 3.97 3.948 3.741 3.965 2.912 3.846 3.667 3.058 3.748 3.969




Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 
 
Verification Costs – Low 
 
SH_1 3.606 3.714 3.147 3.444 3.792 3.764 3.795 3.544 3.833 3.668 3.586
SH_2 5.672 5.501 5.743 4.865 5.625 5.458 5.682 5.93 5.614 6.077 5.388
SCR_1 3.254 3.064 3.26 3.296 3.362 3.292 3.32 3.366 3.356 3.247 3.248
SCR_2 3.282 3.808 3.881 3.789 3.86 3.95 3.891 3.648 4.014 3.867 3.912
SCM_1 4.413 3.964 4.821 4.656 4.331 4.618 4.933 4.888 4.929 4.902 4.772
SCM_2 3.56 3.358 3.603 3.476 3.174 3.447 3.615 3.475 3.497 3.587 3.621
DSB_1 2.46 2.268 2.456 2.476 2.356 2.4 2.512 2.421 2.208 2.478 2.506
DSB_2 2.419 2.303 2.416 2.379 2.454 2.454 2.449 2.179 2.111 2.459 2.435
DEF_1 2.019 2.148 2.189 1.993 2.174 2.109 2.11 1.947 2.026 2.197 2.204
DEF_2 2.518 2.344 2.516 2.529 2.527 2.446 2.218 2.176 2.336 2.525 2.535
VC_1 1.357 1.429 1.371 1.372 1.415 1.413 1.402 1.427 1.426 1.422 1.342
VC_2 1.304 1.246 1.348 1.365 1.354 1.402 1.394 1.389 1.406 1.403 1.319








SH_1 1.977 2.048 1.762 1.997 2.02 2.067 2.037 2.072 2.074 2.058 1.927
SH_2 2.103 2.207 2.188 1.94 2.078 2.207 1.86 2.201 2.065 1.978 1.81
SCR_1 1.559 1.579 1.57 1.495 1.485 1.53 1.573 1.553 1.577 1.571 1.513
SCR_2 2.496 2.913 2.922 2.836 2.751 2.586 2.931 2.812 2.925 2.905 2.864
SCM_1 2.094 1.912 2.059 2.099 2.167 2.173 2.095 2.016 2.101 2.145 2.087
SCM_2 2.317 2.24 2.238 2.227 2.371 2.355 2.378 2.354 2.306 2.352 2.109
DSB_1 2.161 2.169 2.101 1.909 2.167 2.147 2.167 2.168 2.123 2.083 2.067
DSB_2 2.975 2.553 3.018 3.021 2.918 3.028 3.027 2.793 2.62 2.62 2.058
DEF_1 2.066 2.063 2.034 1.979 1.917 2.046 2.067 1.907 1.987 1.978 2.068
DEF_2 1.698 1.589 1.695 1.69 1.64 1.645 1.662 1.468 1.631 1.679 1.607
VC_1 2.004 1.81 2.009 1.997 1.992 1.996 1.94 1.747 1.932 1.998 1.885
VC_2 3.697 3.263 3.812 3.878 3.818 3.527 3.791 2.703 3.979 3.766 3.713




APPENDIX D: Vignette Scenarios 
 
 
Vignette – HCC-High, Opacity-High 
You are having the first meeting with the founder of a new venture to discuss a new business 
loan request. The founder informs you the new venture has secured contracts with reputable 
companies within the industry. During the discussion, you are thinking about the current 
economic climate and the fact that analysts are predicting a recession soon. The founder 
then supplies you with a list of unrecognizable industry professionals they have worked with 
in the past. 
 
Vignette – HCC-High, Opacity-Low 
You are having the first meeting with the founder of a new venture to discuss a new business 
loan request. The founder informs you they have borrowed money in the past and paid back 
as agreed. The founder also tells you they have personal equity invested in the venture. As 
the conversation continues, you find out that the new venture doesn’t necessarily need a bank 
loan, but would like to start a credit history for their business. Finally, the founder tells you 
they were referred to you by another banker that you know very well.  
 
Vignette – HCC-Low, Opacity-High 
You are having the first meeting with the founder of a new venture to discuss a new business 
loan request. The founder informs you that this new venture is more of hobby. The founder 
also tells you they have secured contracts with unknown companies in unrelated industries. 
As the conversation continues, you find out that the founder of the new venture is very good 
friends with your bank president.  
 
Vignette – HCC-Low, Opacity-Low 
You are having the first meeting with the founder of a new venture to discuss a new business 
loan request. The founder informs you they refuse to use any personal capital or have “skin 
in the game” to fund the new venture. As the conversation continues, you find out that the 
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